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DIME STORE DEMONSTRATIONS:
EVENTS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
FIRST SIXTY DAYS
DANIEL H. POLLITT*
E DWARD P. MORGAN: I wonder if you consider the cur-
rent Ghandi-like passive resistance demonstrations of Ne-
groes in the South as worthy of identification as manifestations
of moral courage, or whether you disapprove of them?
President Eisenhower: Now, let me make one thing dear.
I am deeply sympathetic with the efforts of any group to enjoy
the rights, the rights of equality that they are guaranteed by the
Constitution.... If a person is expressing such an aspiration as
this in a perfectly legal way, then I don't see any reason why he
should not do it.'
In 1865, the thirteenth amendment was ratified, ending the institu-
tion of slavery. In i866, to eliminate the burdens, disabilities, and
incidents of slavery, Congress passed a Civil Rights Bill securing to the
Negro "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil free-
dom."'2  Among these fundamental rights guaranteed the Negro is
"the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property."' In 1866, Congress proposed the fourteenth
*A.B. 194.3, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 949, Cornell University. Member of
the New York and District of Columbia bars; Associate Professor of Law, University
of North Carolina. Contributor to legal periodicals.
'N.Y. Times, March 17, i96o, p. 16, col. x.
'The words are those of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. i,
22 (1883).
14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1958). Congressman Trumbull, the
sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, explained its necessity as follows:
"That the result of the recent war, and the enactment of the measures to which the
events of the war naturally led us, have intensified the hate of the controlling class in the
insurgent States toward our colored citizens is a fact against which we can neither shut
our ears nor close our eyes. Laws barbaric and treatment inhuman are the rewards
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amendment so as to incorporate this fundamental right of civil freedom
"in the organic law of the land" and to eliminate doubt as to its consti-
tutional validity.4 In 1868, the fourteenth amendment was ratified,
guaranteeing to all persons "the equal protection of the laws" and "the
privileges or immunities of citizens." Among the "privileges and im-
munities" guaranteed the citizen is "protection by the government, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind."5
The constitutional promise of equality in opportunity has been
broken to the hope. The congressional efforts in 1866 to guarantee the
freed Negro equality with others in the purchase of real and personal
property has been thwarted. As long ago as 1872, Booker T. Wash-
ington, born a slave, experienced racial discrimination when attempting
to purchase the necessities of life. Setting off by stage from his home
in West Virginia to study at the Hampton Institute on the Atlantic
shore of Virginia, he was denied shelter and food when the coach
stopped for the night at a remote hotel in the mountains. He was
forced to walk the hills all night long to keep warm. On the second
night of the trip, the coach stopped in the capital city of Richmond.
Again, rebuffed in his efforts to obtain a night's lodging, the young boy
found shelter under the elevated wood planks then forming the cities'
sidewalks.6 Were Booker T. Washington to make the same trip
today, he would find the situation but little improved.
Throughout the South, the hotels, motels, restaurants, and lunch
counters discriminate on the basis of color.' In some few instances, this
discrimination is required by statute or city ordinance." In most in-
stances, it is a matter of custom and tradition, and fear of losing white
business if Negroes are served. The degree of discrimination varies
meted out by our white enemies to our colored friends. We should put a stop to this at
once and forever. And yet I would not do this in a way which would deprive a white
man of a single right to which he is entitled. I would merely enforce justice for all
men; and this is lawful, it is right, and it is our bounden duty." CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th
Cong., ist Sess. 1118 (1866).
'Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
'The words are those of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.
C.C. 371 (1823), a case arising under the privileges and immunities clause in art. IV,
§ 2 of the Constitution. The words were quoted with approval in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873), where the Court first construed the purpose
and meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
'MATHEWS, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 42 (948).
'GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 80 (1959).
a See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18-327 (1949), as contrued in Nash v. Air Terminal
Serv., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949) ; DURHAM, N. C., CODE § 4z (1947).
' In the university village of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where the student body
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from area to area and from store to store. In some instances, no service
is given Negroes. In other instances, Negroes may be permitted to
purchase food to take out and eat off the premises. In still other
instances, the Negro customer may eat while standing, but not while
sitting; or he may be permitted to sit at the counter, but not in a booth.
I
THE EVENTS
On February i, 196o, four Negro students at North Carolina A. & T.
College in Greensboro, North Carolina, decided to do something about
this unequal treatment. It all began in September 1959, when fresh-
men Ezell Blair and Joseph McNeill, both seventeen years of age,
were assigned as roommates. They, and two other freshmen in their
dormitory, spent much time discussing some of the segregated situa-
tions to which they were exposed. On Sunday evening of January 31,
1960, one of the boys said "We've talked about it long enough, let's
do something." The something was a walk to the dime store and an
attempt to get coffee. The manager said he could not serve them be-
cause of local custom, so they just sat and waited. The only trouble
that first day came from the Negro help who came out of the kitchen
to tell the boys, now known on their campus as the "four freshmen,"
that they were doing a bad thing. Other students from the college
were shopping in the store at the time, and when the four freshmen
returned to the campus, twenty students volunteered to join them for
the next afternoon. Ground rules were drawn up by the expanded
group. There was to be absolutely no name-calling by Negroes, no
raised voices, no word of protest if they were not served.
Again, Tuesday they were refused service. They just sat. On
Wednesday and Thursday, they returned, in greater strength each time.
The A. & T. students were joined by many students from the Negro
forms the bulk of the restaurant patronage, the students, by poll and student body reso-
lution, demonstrated an overwhelming desire for the termination of discrimination against
Negro students. Three of the restaurants ended segregation some years ago, but the
other restauranteurs refused to do likewise with the statement that "individually they
were in no position to take any action." One such restauranteur cited his "high class
waitresses" as the main reason for his discriminatory policy. Daily Tar Heel (Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.), March 3, 596o, P. 2, col. 1.
Some restauranteurs refused to end discrimination on the theory that serving Negroes
would require the installation of two new toilet facilities: one for colored men, the
other for colored women. There is no statutory enactment requiring racially-segregated
toilet facilities in restaurants, although there is such a requirement in manufacturing
establishments in North Carolina cities with a population of over one thousand. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 95-48 (1958).
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Bennett College and also by a few students from the white Woman's
College of the University of North Carolina, both located in Greens-
boro.
By Friday, white teenagers had begun heckling the demonstrators.
On Saturday, the Woolworth store was jammed with Negroes and
whites. The Negroes mostly sat, while the white boys waved Con-
federate flags, chanted, and cursed. Around midafternoon, the manage-
ment received a bomb threat, and the police emptied the store. When
the store opened Monday, the lunch counters were closed. Dr. Gordon
Blackwell, Chancellor of the Woman's College, proposed a "truce
period" which was accepted to work things out in a less inflammatory
atmosphere. Thus ended temporarily the Greensboro demonstrations;
but by that time, Negro students were demonstrating in Winston-Salem,
in Durham, in Charlotte, and the other principal North Carolina cities.10
The demonstrations in their origin were student-inspired and di-
rected. Subsequently, organizations such as the National Student
Association, the Congress of Racial Equality, and the National As-
sociation for Advancement of Colored People offered their guidance
and sponsorship." In some instances, the help of these organizations
was accepted; in other instances, the students decided to go it alone.
The reasons prompting the demonstrations have been expressed by
the student leaders in various forms. Leaders in Greensboro, where
the demonstrations originated, wrote the state Attorney General that
"this mass movement was begun to bring to the realization of the citi-
zens of North Carolina that the Negroes, who are also citizens of North
Carolina, can no longer remain quiet and complacent and continue
to accept such gross injustice."'" The student leader in Charlotte
explained that the demonstration there was a "means of expressing
something that has been in our hearts for a long time."' High school
students in Chapel Hill carried signs saying "We do not picket just
because we want to eat. We can eat at home or walking down the
street. We do picket to protest the lack of dignity and respect shown
us as human beings."' 4
'0 N.Y. Times, March z6, 196o, p. io, col. 6.
"' Author Harry Golden of Charlotte, N.C., commented that, "If the NAACP and
every other do-good organization disappeared from the face of the earth tonight, the
movement would not skip a beat." Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March zo, 196o ,
§ A, p. 8, col. 4.
1N.Y. Times, March 6, 196o, p. 3, col. 2.
" Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 14, 196o, § A, p. z, col. 8.
14 Chapel Hill (N.C.) Weekly, March Z4, x96o, p. 4, col. x.
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The demonstrations struck a responsive chord in the hearts of
Negro students elsewhere. Many of them mentioned the lack of
progress in ending school desegregation as a reason for their presence
on the lunch-counter picket lines. The struggle against school segre-
gation took place in the courts, and required money, endless patience,
and an appreciation or understanding of delicate legal moves and coun-
ter-maneuvers. The struggle against lunch-counter segregation re-
quired only courage and an ability to "turn the other cheek."15  As a
result, students in Durham, in Charlotte, in Winston-Salem, in at least
sixteen North Carolina cities began "sit-ins" or picket-line demonstra-
tions at downtown chain drug and dime stores.' 6 The demonstrations
moved northward into Virginia and West Virginiai south into South
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; and west into Tennessee, Kentucky,
Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas. Pickets even appeared before
those stores 'and restaurants in Ohio which violated the state equal
accommodation laws by denying service to Negroes. The Raleigh
News and Observer commented that with the arrest of demonstrators
in that city, "the picket line now extends from the dime stores to the
United States Supreme Court and beyond that to national and world
opinion.' 8
The European press gave wide coverage to the demonstrations.
Communist radios and newspapers in Eastern Europe hit the discrimi-
nation theme hard, and even newspapers ordinarily friendly to the
United States were critical. For example, the Austrian Socialist Party's
Daily Arbeiter Zeitung published a front-page criticism of American
racial discrimination, with a cartoon depicting a gorilla-like Southern
white refusing service to a Negro girl. The cartoon was captioned
"That is a free country."' 9  Both the Kremlin's Pravda and the Vati-
can's Osservatore Romano gave front-page headlines to the story of
how white men in Houston, Texas, captured a Negro youth and carved
Ku Klux Klan initials on his chest and back.20 The Rev. Dr. Billy
"5 The writer is informed that demonstrators in High Point, Chapel Hill, and other
cities in North Carolina have classes in the techniques of nonviolence, and are required
to pledge passive resistance before they can participate in the picket lines. Many stu-
dents at North Carolina College in Durham withdrew from the activities when they
discovered they were unable to "take" the vilification and abuse sometimes meted the
demonstrators.
1 Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 2o, 196o, § A, p. 12, col. 2.
1 N.Y. Times, March 3, 196o, p. Is, col. 1.
"Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, March 16, 196o, p. 8, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, March 4, 196o, p. 1i, col. 1.
1 Id., March ix, 196o, p. 14, col. 4; id., March 9, 196o, p. 19, col. I.
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Graham, conducting a two-day religious crusade in Ethiopia, was asked
almost exclusively about this matter at a press conference."'
In the North, religious, labor, and liberal organizations and indi-
viduals spoke out in support of the demonstrations. Delegates to a
fourteen-state Midwestern Democratic conference adopted a proposed
civil rights plank demanding equal rights for all Americans in voting,
education, housing, and service at lunchrooms.22 Earlier, Mrs. Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt had called the demonstrations "simply wonderful" 23
and United Auto Workers' president, Walter Reuther, had called on
the President to restore law and order in Alabama so picketing could
be resumed in Montgomery.24  The greatest and most vocal support,
however, came from the college students. This issue aroused the
present campus generation-often accused of self-concern and pallid
indifference to social or political questions-as have few others. Vassar
girls picketed for the first time in twenty years; and student groups at
Harvard, Yale, Brown, Chicago, Wisconsin, Colorado, and other cam-
puses sprang up over night to picket the local branches of the chain
stores that discriminated in the South.25 Student groups at Wesleyan
University, Harpur College, and elsewhere set about raising scholarship
money and bail funds to assist the Negro students expelled or im-
prisoned because of participation in the demonstrations."
In the South, the most vociferous support for the demonstrations
came from the clergy. Ministers, Negro and white, singly and in asso-
ciation, defended the spirit and purposes of the demonstrators. One
such minister wrote that "the Negroes now confront us with the Consti-
tution in one hand and the Bible in the other. . . . Why do we not
grant these rights gracefully and with good will?" ' 27 A national Protes-
tant Episcopal organization said that "such demonstrative witness, moti-
vated by love and expressed in nonviolent, passive resistance to evil, is
thoroughly grounded in Christian teaching."2 The Rev. Dr. Ernest
"2 Reverend Graham answered that, "Such horrible acts are a stumbling block in the
Christian world, are detestable and should be forthrightly condemned by all Christians."
Id., March ii, i96o, p. 14, col. 4.
2 Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, March z8, i96o, p. x, col. 6.
.'She also expressed opposition to sympathy boycotts in the North where the stores
were not segregated. N.Y. Times, March 23, I960, p. 18, Col. 3.
2 Id., March 13, 196o, p. 43, col. S.
"Id., March 2o, i96o, p. 1, col. a.
26 The students called this a "more constructive expression of our support than picket-
ing a dime store." Id., March 2z, i96o, p. 20, col. i ; id., March 19, 296o, p. 9, col. 3.2
' Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, Feb. ix, 196o, § A, p. 4, col. 5.
2'8 N.Y. Times, March 6, 296o, p. 74, col. 3-
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Trice Thompson, the highest elected officer of the Southern Presby-
terian Church, said that the demonstrations were serving to call atten-
tion to "discriminations which should be forgotten and which will pass.
All discriminations will, and must, disappear.) 2sa Former United States
Representative C. B. Deane, now president of the North Carolina Bap-
tist State Convention, told a group of ministers that Baptists "cannot
tiptoe around the racial issue," and that "in order to reach the Cross and
solve the wave of sit-downs, ... the South ... must be willing to pay
the price of personal change.112Sb The Durham, North Carolina, Min-
isters Association pledged support to the management of local stores if
there be a decision "to inaugurate a policy of food-service without regard
to race" and promised "to encourage the community at large to accept
such a policy.1 29 The Chapel Hill, North Carolina, ministers simul-
taneously issued to their congregations a "Statement of Convictions"
that stated in part that "we deplore the fact that any group of our citi-
zens is placed in the position of having to ask to be treated with dignity
and respect. '30
The clergy was not alone in its support of the demonstrators.
Florida's Governor LeRoy Collins told a state-wide radio and television
audience that "I don't mind saying that if a man has a department store
and he invites the public generally to come in his department store and
trade I think then it is unfair and morally wrong for him to single out
one department, though, and say he does not want or will not allow
Negroes to patronize that one department."'" Frank P. Graham, who
formerly served North Carolina in the United States Senate and as
president of the University of North Carolina, told a United Nations
model assembly that the Negro demonstrators find that "in sitting down
they are standing up for the American dream" and said the Negro
students are "in their day and generation renewing springs of American
democracy. 32  The North Carolina AFL-CIO in state convention went
on record in support of the Negro efforts to get desegregated lunch
s'Id., March 28, i96o, p. 26, col. i.
.sb Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, March 24, 1958, p. 12, col. 4.
"o Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 15, x96o, § B, p. 1, col. 3.
'0 Chapel Hill (N.C.) Weekly, March 24, i96o, p. 4, col. 2. These and similar
statements so alarmed the Mississippi legislature that it passed a bill aimed at preventing
church integration. The measure authorizes the state chancery courts, upon petition of
two-thirds of the membership of a congregation, to dismiss its trustees and appoint new
ones should the trustees vote to bring Negroes into white churches. N.Y. Times, March
25, i96o, p. 19, col. 1.
"Ild., March 21, 196o, p. 37 C, col. I.
"Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 13, 196o, § C, p. 1o, col. 6.
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counter service; 33 and the North Carolina Student Legislative Assem-
bly, representing seven Negro and eleven white colleges in the state,
voted to ban segregation in eating establishments.3 4 The Greensboro
Daily News said editorially: "There are many white people in the South
who recognize the injustice of the lunch counter system. It is based on
circumstances which may have made sense xoo years ago; today it has a
touch of medievalism. It smacks of Indian 'untouchables' or Hitlerian
Germany's Master Race Theories." 5 The Raleigh News and Observer
editorialized that the racial line between counters in the same store is
"fuzzy, twisting and uncertain" and commented that "no 'now you see
see it, now you don't' color line can be meticulously maintained."3"
Within two months the demonstrations had practical effect. In San
Antonio, Texas, downtown stores opened their lunch counters to all
persons, regardless of color, T as did the stores in Galveston"a A bus
station cafe in Nashville served several Negroes without incident, 8 as
did three drug stores in Salisbury, North Carolina.39  In Winston-
Salem40 and in Chapel Hill, North Carolina,4' as well as in Suffolk,
Virginia,4" store managers removed stools and opened on a service-to-
all-who-stand-up basis.43 The Chapel Hill Mayor's Committee on
Human Relations reports that "quietly and without fanfare, several
restaurants began offering equal service to Negro customers. 44  In
Lenoir, North Carolina, Negro students were permitted to make use
of the downtown library for the "first time within memory."4" How
" Id., March 19, 196o, §B, p. 7, col. 7-
"'Id., March 2o, 196o, §A, p. 8, col. 4.
" Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, March 29, i96o, p. 8, col. i.
36Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, March 16, 596o, p. 8, col. i.
"'N.Y. Times, March 2o, 596o, p. 1, Col. 2.
...Id., April 6, i96o, p. i, Col. 8.
"Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 17, 196o, § A, p. 2, COl. 7.
"Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, March 13, 196o, § III, p. 2, col 7.
'
0 Ibid.
"'Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March z7, 196o, § A, p. 6, col. 2.
'"N.Y. Times, March 19, 196o, p. 9, col. 3.
"'The Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, March 13, 1960, § III, p. , col. 7, commented
that "some future logician will be baffled by an ancient logic that it was all right for a
man to stand up and eat next to a person of another color but all wrong to eat sitting
next to him." The future logician will be troubled also by the mores which permit
complete and courteous service to the department store Negro customer in the lingerie,
millinery, and shoe departments, but which draw the line at giving any service in the
food departments.
"Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 27, 196o, § A, p. 6, col. z.
"Id., March 23, 196o, §A, p. 8, col. 4.
[Vol. i 96o: 3 15
Vol. 196o: 35] DIME STORE DEMONSTR4TIONS 323
many more establishments have "quietly" opened their facilities to
Negroes cannot be known.
Most Southern opinion was against the demonstrators. Lunchroom
proprietors generally held fast to traditional policies. Public officials
warned against participation in the demonstrations. Students in some
areas were expelled from college and in others threatened with expul-
sion. In a few instances, planned mass prayer meetings were thwarted
by use of fire hoses, tear gas, and mass arrest. With a few notable
exceptions, the press was generally critical.4 6 The details of the opposi-
tion are highlighted on a state by state basis.
I. Alabama
The demonstrations reached Alabama on February 25, when thirty-
five Negro students from Alabama State College asked for service in
the Montgomery County courthouse snack shop.41 The shop dosed
immediately. The sheriff soon arrived with a dub in hand and ordered
the Negroes to line up in single file. While pistol-carrying deputies
patrolled the halls outside the basement shop, state highway patrolmen
took pictures of the Negroes who stood quietly against the wall. Gover-
nor John Patterson ordered an investigation and indicated that the
students would be expelled. The following day the Police Commis-
sioner warned that any sit-down would be considered a "breach of the
peace" and that his department would not permit efforts to foment
violence; the Governor ordered the President of Alabama State College
to expel any student involved in a sit-downi and the Negro students
held a campus rally to consider mass application at the white state
institutions should a Negro student be expelled.48
On February 27, a Negro woman was attacked by one of a group of
' The following report is taken from the N.Y. Times, March 6, 196o, p. 3, col. 3:
"The Southern press has generally deplored the demonstrations. But some editors have
found the Negroes a cut above the whites who turned out to torment them. The Rich-
mond News Leader said Virginians must have 'felt a twinge of wry regret' over circum-
stances surrounding a 'sit-in' in that city. The newspaper continued: 'Here were the
colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties, and one of them was reading Goethe and one
was taking notes from a biology text. And here, on the sidewalk outside, was a gang
of white boys come to heckle, a ragtail rabble, slackjawed, black-jacketed, grinning fit
to kill, and some of them, God save the mark, were waving the proud and honored flag
of the Southern States in the last war fought by gentlemen: Eheu! It gives one pause.? "
"' N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 196o, p. 8, col. 3. It is unconstitutional for such a lunch-
room to deny service to Negroes. Derrington v. Plummer, 24o F.zd 922 (5th Cir.
z956), cert. d35ied, 3 U.S. 924 (957)-
'
81d., Feb. 27, 196o, p. zo, col. I.
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twenty-five whites who patrolled the streets carrying miniature baseball
bats inside paper bags. Negroes made plans for a mass "hymn-singing,
prayer session" protest."9
On March i, a thousand Negro students sang the national anthem
on the Capitol steps,5 ° and a. Negro minister told the audience "I am
proud to be a member of a generation that is willing to stand on the roof
tops and tell the world that they want to be free.151
On March 2, nine Negro students were ordered expelled for taking
part in the demonstrations, the Governor commenting that such action
was necessary "to prevent bloodshed in this city."
'52
On Sunday, March 6, approximately 8oo Negroes left their churches
for a demonstration prayer meeting at the State Capitol grounds. A
jeering mob of whites charged the marchers, and a riot was narrowly
averted when the police separated the two groups, and mounted deputies
and fire trucks moved in to prevent further violence. The march had
been announced two days earlier, and at the appointed time, high city,
county, and state officials, fifty highway patrolmen, mounted sheriff's
deputies, and two fire trucks were on hand. When the Negroes left the
church, the firemen pointed their hoses at the Negroes, and policemen
pushed them back as they started in the direction of the capitol
building.53
On March 8, a scheduled campus protest meeting was broken up
when police arrived and arrested thirty students and one faculty mem-
ber standing in the student crowd. Two other students were jailed
while trying to get in to see the students already under arrest.54
In the following days, students at Alabama State College held an-
other campus demonstration against the arrests (this time without inci-
dent); Negro youths in Huntsville in northern Alabama marched
silently through the business section bearing antisegregation signs; and
students at Tuskegee Institute stayed away from class in sympathy
protest. On March io, the Montgomery Police Commissioner recom-
mended the dosing of Alabama State College and accused it of turning
out "graduates of hate and racial bitterness."55
On March ii, the Montgomery City Court convicted thirty-two
'
0 Id., March x, x96o, p. 21, col. 3-
I°ld, March 7, 196o, p. , col. 3.
zId., March 6, 196o, p. 3, col. i.
1 Id., March 3, 196o, p. 15, col. i.
1 Id., March 7, 196o, p. 1, col. 3.
4Id., March 9, 1960, p. 19, col. x.
1 Id., March ix, 196o, p. 1S, col. 4.
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Negro students of disorderly conduct. The judge delayed sentencing,
which could amount to six months in jail, and the attorney for the
defendants told the court that the student body at Alabama State Col-
lege had agreed to return to class and stop the racial demonstrations."6
On March 22, seven Negroes applied for enrollment at the Univer-
sity of Alabama Extension College in Montgomery. The applications
were the first in Alabama since Autherine Lucy was driven from the
University of Alabama campus by a mob.57 By March 25, the number
of applications had risen to thirteen. The University of Alabama is
under court injunction not to bar any applicant on grounds of race.5"
2. Arkansas
Arkansas joined the list of southern states hit by demonstrations on
March i, when about forty-five students from Philander Smith Col-
lege entered a Little Rock variety store and sat down at a white lunch
counter. The incident ended without violence when Police Chief Gene
Smith recommended dosing the counter. Most of the Negroes left
quietly, but five who refused were seized on charges of disturbing the
peace.59 On March 17, the five Negroes were convicted under a 1959
state law that prohibits causing a "breach of the peace" at a public place.
Each of the Negroes was fined 25o dollars and sentenced to thirty days
in jail. Immediately thereafter, other Negro college students sat down
at five all-white lunch counters but left when store officials asked them
to do so.0
3. Florida
The demonstrations began in this state on February 26 with a sit-in
in Tallahassee. Eleven Negro students were arrested and charged with
disturbing the peace."1 Ten days later, forty Negro youths staged a
sit-down protest at a Tampa Woolworth lunch counter. The counter
was dosed without incident.62 The sit-ins quickly spread to St. Peters-
burg, Sarasota, and Daytona Beach. No violence was reported, and
none of the Negroes received service. 3
On March 3, Governor LeRoy Collins termed sit-down demonstra-
"'Id., March 12, 96o, p. 15, cOl. 4.
" Id., March 23, 196o, p. i8, col. 3.
"
8 Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619 (sth Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956).
" N.Y. Times, March ri, 196o, p. 15, cOl. 4.
Cold., March iS, 196o, p. 23, col. x.
:1Id., Feb. 27, 196o, p. 20, col. I.
'sId., March x, 196o, p. z1, col. 6.
"Id., March 3, 196o, p. 15, col. x.
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tions "illegal and dangerous" and said that a 1957 law gave restaurant
owners the right to refuse to serve anyone they considered undesirable.0 4
On March 4, eight ministers tried to enter a lunchroom in Miami's
Burdine's department store, but were blocked by store employees. A
cross was burned in front of a Negro home in Pensacola.",
On March 12, the demonstrations reached Jacksonville. Eight
Negroes sat down at the lunch counter of a Kress's dime store. The
counter was dosed. The Negroes remained seated until seven police-
men arrived and asked them to leave. They did. On the same day,
there was near-violence in Tallahassee. A group of Negro and white
demonstrators at a Woolworth store were arrested, replaced by another
group that was arrested, and by a third group that was arrested.
Shortly after noon, a crowd of about 125 Negroes gathered in a park
across the street from the police station and started down the block
toward the Woolworth store. Half-way there, they were met by a
group of white men, turned and started back to their campus, while the
whites followed with taunts and jeers. Off-duty policemen and firemen
were stationed throughout the city to avert disturbances. " On March
15, the Tallahassee City Commission warned that "those who violate
the law will find we are prepared to take stern action."" 7
On March 17, a group of eight students entered the Woolworth
store in St. Augustine, the counter was dosed, and when the Negroes
left, they were attacked by a group of white men. Police called a cab
to take the Negroes away, and the Chief of Police, armed with tear gas,
ordered the crowd to disperse. 8
On March 1 8, authorities at the white Florida State University in
Tallahassee warned students against participation in the demonstra-
tions,60 and, on the same day eleven Negro student demonstrators were
convicted in Tallahassee on charges of disturbing the peace. Eight of
them chose sixty-day jail sentences rather than pay the fines of 300
dollars.70
On March 20, Governor Collins declared in a state-wide radio and
television speech that it is "unfair and morally wrong" not to allow
Negroes to patronize one department of a store in which they are
"Id., March 4, 196o, p. ii, col. i.
"
5 Id., March 5, 796o, p. 1o, col. 1.
"Id., March i3, 196o, p. 43, col. 4.
"'Id., March x6, 796o, p. 27, col. 2.
"Id., March xS, 196o, p. 23, col. I.
"Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March ig, 796o, § B, p. 4, col. 6.
10N.Y. Times, March 19, 796o, p. i, col. 8.
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invited to trade. He announced that he would appoint a state bi-racial
advisory committee on racial relations and called upon the cities in
Florida to take similar action."' Within a week the Governor received
a heavy volume of mail, mostly from Floridians, running eight-to-one
in his support. The Governor received 2,381 favorable letters, 288
hostile ones. Nearly all the favorable mail was signed, and about a
fourth of it came from clergymen, physicians, lawyers, and educators.
About one-third of the unfavorable mail was anonymous, much of it
scurrilous.7la
4. Georgia
On Friday, March 4, a small group of white and Negro students
entered Rich's Department Store in Atlanta and were served at the
lunch counter. The group was also served on Saturday, but on Monday,
March 7, the group was turned away by store offiCials.
712
On March io, seven Negroes took seats in a white section of the
Municipal Auditorium during a stage show. There was a brief verbal
clash that ended when police designated the occupied section Negro.73
On March i5, approximately 2oo students in Atlanta staged simul-
taneous sit-ins at noontime at the lunch rooms of the State Capitol, the
Courthouse, the City Hall, the bus stations, the railway stations, two
office buildings housing federal offices, and a variety store. Seventy-seven
of them were arrested under a recent state law aimed at sit-down
demonstrations making it a misdemeanor to refuse to leave private
property when requested.74
On March I6, there was a "sit-in" in Savannah, and on March i7,
following a big St. Patrick's Day parade, there were scattered fist fights
and rock throwing between groups of whites and Negroes. Police and
troopers patrolled the downtown business section, dispersing crowds
and whisking troublemakers to jail. 5
On March 26, white and Negro pickets marched in front of Rich's
Department Store in Atlanta, scene of the first "sit-in," and 25,ooo leaf-
lets were distributed urging a boycott of stores with segregation
policies. 0
"'Id., P. 37, col. I.
"I., March 30, 196o, p. 21, col. 1.
'2 Id., March 8, 196o, p. 19, cOl. 3-
"Id., March ii, x96o, p. 1S, col. 4.
"'Id., March 16, 196o, p. 27, col I.
" Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 18, 196o, § B, p. 8, col. 6.
'6 Id., March 27, 196o, § C, p. 1z, col 3.
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5. Louisiana
On March 8, the first public demonstration by Negroes in New
Orleans took place on the campus of Dillard University. Spokesmen
said the group had no plans to march on downtown New Orleans. 1
On March 12, police in New Orleans arrested ten white youths in
connection with cross-burnings on the campus of Dillard.78
On March.28, eight students from the all-Negro Southern Univer-
sity in Baton Rouge were arrested after they refused to leave a white
lunch counter at a downtown department store.70 On March 29, nine
additional Negro college students in Baton Rouge were arrested at
lunch counters. The students at Southern University then decided to
forego their junior and senior proms and use the dance money to finance
future demonstrations. Governor Long commented that if the demon-
strators "want to do any real good they should return to their native
Africa.380
On March 30, i,ooo students at Baton Rouge marched to the Capi-
tol chanting "The Lord's Prayer." After singing "What a Friend
We Have in Jesus," they disbanded without incident.8 ' The Southern
University promptly suspended or expelled eighteen student leaders,
and the students thereupon boycotted classes and more than two-thirds
of them requested withdrawal forms.81a
6. North Carolina
Greensboro in this state was the scene of the initial sit-ins, and at
least sixteen other cities witnessed "sit-ins" and picketing, some of the
picketing on a day-to-day basis over a period of many weeks. Despite
the vigor of the activities, there was no violence, no tear gas, no fire
hoses. Large groups of Negro students held prayer meetings on the
steps of the state capitol82 and on the courthouse lawns at cities through-
out the state with no other obstructions but jeers and catcalls.8 The
picketing at Chapel Hill, typical of that in Durham and elsewhere, was
described by a local newspaper in the following terms:84
""N.Y. Times, March 9, 196o, p. 19, col. 2.
"Id., March 13, 196o, p. 43, col. 5.
'9Id., March 29, 196o, p. 28, col. 2.
gold., March 30, 596o, p. 25, col. x.
" Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 31, 196o, § A, p. is, col. x.
"' N.Y. Times, April i, 196o, p. I, col. 4.
2 Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March is, 1g6o, § A, p. 3, col. 6.
S3 N.Y. Times, March 5, 196o, p. 1o, col. 1.
*' News of Orange County (N.C.), March 31, 196o, p. 1, col. 3.
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The Chapel Hill police are more and more effectively controlling the
weekday afternoon 9o minute sidewalk picketing demonstrations in front of a
local drugstore.
Chief Blake has pre-set plans all ready to be put into action in the unlikely
event of any disorder arising-and with each passing day this prospect seems
less. But there are certain little innuendoes beyond the pale of legal control
that pass back and forth between the opposing sides.
Smirks, sneers, frowns, smiles, the flicker of an eyelash meaningfully-
these are some of the means of communication even though police rapidly
control and largely prevent the passing of actual words or actions.
Picture-taking also figures significantly in the psychology of the affair.
The picketers, committed to impassive silent marching, are about the most-
photographed subjects in all Chapel Hill during the last month. The other
day one of the protest supporters, apparently just for the heck of it, pulled a
new switch, and tried to photograph some of the spectators. The surprised
and unwilling subjects fled pell mell before the lensman.
Some stores in Winston-Salem, Salisbury, Chapel Hill, and else-
where ended racial barriers, 5 and the mayors in Raleigh, Durham,
Greensboro, and elsewhere established interracial committees to deal
with the situation."' Large proportions of the faculties at Wake Forest,
Duke, and the University of North Carolina signed petitions urging
the end of segregation and promising continuing patronage to those
merchants who eliminated color bars at the lunch counter, and in Chapel
Hill, a few University professors joined the Negro high school students
on the picket line. 7  Negroes were permitted to use the downtown
public library in Lenoir for the first time within memory."'
Although there were no riots, no tear gas, no fire hoses, etc., there
were shouts, shoves, near-crises, and arrests a-plenty. In Winston-Salem,
twenty-two youths of both races were arrested when they refused to
leave a restricted lunch counter in a Woolworth store." In Charlotte,
three Negro demonstrators were arrested at the entrance to a basement
cafeteria of Belk's Department Store.90 In Raleigh, forty-one students
were arrested for trespassing on the sidewalks of a privately-owned
" N.Y. Times, March 8, 196o, p. zx, col. i.
8
"Id., March 5, 196o, P. io, col. i; id., Feb. z7, i96o, p. 2o, col. i.
87 Chapel Hill (N.C.) Weekly, March 24, i96o, p. i, col. 6.
"' Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March z3, 196o, § A, p. 8, col. .
"D N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, x96o, p. 36, col. 6.
"°Id., Feb. 24, x96o, p. 36, col.' .
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shopping center."' In Durham, two students were arrested when they
refused to take the sandwiches they had purchased outside to eat.
9 2
There were other pressures put on the students in addition to the
arrests. Chancellor Blackwell told the white students at the University
of North Carolina Woman's College "to refrain from any public demon-
stration in connection with the issue now before the community or any
similar issue which may arise in the future." 3  Governor Hodges then
wrote the presidents of all state-supported institutions enlisting their
aid in curbing protest demonstrations, 94 citing the Blackwell speech as
"1Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, Feb. 25, 196o, § C, p. 5, col. i. In an analo-
gous situation, the United States Supreme Court held in 1946 that application of the
state's trespass laws to demonstrators on privately owned sidewalks unconstitutionally
deprived the demonstrators of rights guaranteed by the first amendment. Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), discussed in text accompanying note 209 infra.
2Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March z6, 196o, §B, p. i, col. x. Judge
Wilson, of Durham, acquitted the two students with the comment that "any owner
can refuse to serve anyone he pleases, but once a person is served, regardless of his
race, he has a right to eat it." He added that unless establishments display "For
Whites Only" signs, all races may enter and request service. Durham (N.C.) Morning
Herald, March z9, 196o, § B, p. 1, col. 7-
"3Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, March 27, 296o, § C, p. 5, col. i. A more
complete statement of the Chancellor follows:
"And now, what are your responsibilities as students of the Woman's College in a
controversy such as this?
"First, it should be clear that in this college there should never be any effort to tell
you what stand you should take on controversial issues or how you should assert your
inalienable rights as individuals and as citizens. . . . But your responsibility as students
of Woman's College goes beyond personal considerations. Your class jacket is a symbol
of the college. On and off the campus. you represent this institution. Your actions
bring credit or discredit to the college. You are not living in a social vacuum un-
encumbered by duties and responsibilities. The results of your actions may affect many
others in a kind of chain reaction as has been painfully demonstrated last week.
"There is no blinking the fact that participation in this demonstration by several of
our students, no matter how high their motives, definitely resulted in increasing the
inflammatory quality of the situation . ...
"And so, you see, your every action as an individual must be considered in a social
and institutional context. You must each search out in advance the series of unantici-
pated consequences of any action which you may contemplate. Somewhere between
putty-like conformity on the one hand and irresponsible, martyr-like revolutionary
action on the other, each individual must find for himself or herself the best way of
meeting any controversial situation. ...
"I strongly urge each of you to weigh carefully the probable consequences to your-
self, to the college and to the community of any action that you may contemplate. More
specifically, I advise each of you to refrain from any public demonstration in connection
with the issue now before the community or any similar issue which may arise in the
future. It is only in an atmosphere free from pressure and emotionalism that a fair and
just solution may be found."
" N.Y. Times, March ii, 19 6o, p. 1s, col. 4. At a press conference, the Governor
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evidence of the type of influence he wanted other administrators to
use.
5
At the end of the first sixty days, Negroes in Greensboro resumed
their sit-in strikes, ending a cooling-off period in the city where the
demonstrations originated. During the truce, the Mayor's Advisory
Committee on Community Relations received over 2,000 communica-
tions discussing the problem. Seventy-three per cent of these favored
equality of service on some basis, and the Committee suggested that
the dime stores designate a section of the lunch counter for integrated
service and another section of the counter for whites only. This sug-
gestion was rejected by store managers, who feared a loss in profits if it
was adopted."6
7. Ohio
The demonstrations spread as far north as Ohio. Negro students
picketed variety stores in Cincinnati and were scolded by Governor
DiSalle for not first bringing their complaint to the attention of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 8 Picketing continued, however, and
in Xenia, Ohio, Geyer's Restaurant opened its doors "to everyone" after
approximately ioo Negro and white students engaged in a peaceful
Sunday demonstration.9
8. South Carolina
In this state, the demonstrations began on February 23 in the city of
Rock Hill, when oo Negro students from Friendship College staged a
told reporters he had called the attention of heads of all state-operated colleges and
universities to the portions of the Blackwell remarks quoted in note 93 supra. Reading
a prepared statement, the Governor further said: "As I have previously stated, I do not
think these demonstrations do any good, or in the final analysis will even serve to
accomplish the objectives of the demonstrators." In answer to a. question, the Governor
said he was referring to Negroes who "cause disorder or refuse to obey an order to leave
either by the owner or a police officer." Southern School News, April 196o, p. T3,
col. 1.
" The writer has been reliably informed by faculty members at the Negro North
Carolina College that, following the Governor's announcement, many students received
letters from home telling them to stop demonstrating and keep out of trouble.
"N.Y. Times, April 2, 196o, p. 2 , col. 1.
97 They spread as far west as Nevada, where a threatened sit-in at the Las Vegas
resort hotels was called off when the management agreed to end the existing color bar.
Id., March 25, i96o, p. xS, col. 6.
08 The Governor said: "If we are going to establish government according to law,
the people should first exhaust the avenues supplied by law before they take upon
themselves the creation of disturbances and attempting to injure anyone." Id., March 3,
196o, p. 15, col. 1.
"I d., March 9, 196o, p. 19, col. 2.
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sit-in in two variety stores. 0  This was followed by demonstrations at
the same stores by a robed Ku Klux Klansman who promised future
visits.'01
On March 2, fifty Negroes trudged through an icy drizzle in Colum-
bia, stopping briefly at the Woolworth and Kress stores.10 2 The next
day approximately 200 Negro students marched around in the Columbia
downtown area for nearly two hours. They were heckled by white
youths and left at the request of the City Manager who wanted to avoid(Can explosive situation.' 03  On March 4, the students in Columbia
agreed to discontinue their demonstrations. But in Sumter, twenty-six
Bible-carrying students were arrested for breach of the peace when they
tried to get served at three stores. Bond was set at iOO dollars each,
and the Sheriff said he would see that no businesses there would have to
dose because of such demonstrations.'
On March i5, approximately i,ooo demonstrators from Chaflin
and South Carolina State Colleges converged at noon in downtown
Orangeburg to protest lunch-counter segregation. The police met them
with tear gas and fire hoses. Some 350 drenched demonstrators were
arrested for breach of the peace and put in the courthouse yard behind
a ten-foot high fence in the forty-degree weather while they awaited
questioning. Those who could meet bail were released; those who could
not were put into waiting buses and taken to jail. Magistrate Culler said
he planned to try the students in groups of five, ten, and fifteen with
the comment that "it will probably take all night." While awaiting
their fate, the students broke into song. Their favorites: "God Bless
America" and "Nobody Knows The Trouble I've Seen."' 0 5
9. Tennessee
Chattanooga was the scene of the first Tennessee demonstration,
when Negro high school students staged a sit-in in the Kress store.
Rioting broke out when whites, mostly students, began throwing flower
pots, dishes, bric-a-brac, and other merchandise in the store. One white
youth grabbed a bull whip from the store stock and used it on a Negro.
The Negroes retreated through the streets to a Negro section of the
city, with bricks and other objects being hurled by both sides. After
'Id., Feb. z, I960o, p. 36, col. 7-
101 Id., March i, 196o, p. zi, col. I.
I0 2 d., March 3, 5960, p. 16, col. i.
1 0 3 Id., March 4, 1960, p. ii, Col. i.
1 0 4 Id., March 5, 1960, p. so, col. 1.
... Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, March 16, 196o, p. x, col. 8.
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the fighting had subsided, white youths walked through the aisles of
the Kress and other stores, jeering at Negro customers and frightening
many into leaving. Some of the leaders said their purpose was "to run
the niggers out." Seven whites were arrested, the police concentrating
on the leadership. 10 6 Mayor Olgiatti immediately conferred with white
and Negro clergymen, who issued separate statements calling for an
end to hostile acts. The Negro high school students decided against
further demonstrations. 07
The demonstrations next spread to Nashville. A white youth was
sitting with a group of Negroes at a dime store lunch counter when a
second white youth walked in, called him a "nigger-lover," and twisted
his collar. The assailant then fled, but returned five minutes later.
This time, he grabbed the sitting white youth, threw him on the floor,
and kicked him. The police then ordered everybody to leave the coun-
ter. Eleven Negroes who refused to comply were arrested. 08  The
next day some seventy-six Negro and four white students demonstrated
at downtown lunch counters and were arrested. A crowd of up to 3,000
Negroes thronged the courthouse for the trial, were told to leave the
courthouse, and gathered on the courthouse steps, where they sang
"The Star Spangled Banner" and "The Battle Hymn of the Repub-
lic." 0 9 Two days later, fifty-five more Negro students were arrested,
this time for refusing to leave the lunch counter at the Greyhound bus
station when the Assistant Fire Chief asked all persons to leave the
building while a search for a bomb was made."0 A Negro divinity stu-
dent was expelled from Vanderbilt University for his part in the
demonstration."' The next day, March 4, warrants were issued against
eighty students charging them with conspiring to violate the state trade
and commerce law by helping to direct lunch-counter demonstrations."2
Two weeks later, shortly after the Nashville bus station served Negroes
in the white restaurant, two dynamite caps-but no dynamite-were
found in the washroom" 3
100 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1960, p. 36, col. 3.
'"
7 Id., Feb. z6, x96o, p. 8, Col. 3-
08 Id., Feb. 2S, 196o, p. +5, col. a.
100 Id., March i, 296o, p. z2, col. x.
110 Id., March 3, i96o, p. 1s, col. 1.
1 Id., March 4, 196o, p. ii, col. i. The student had not taken a personal part in
the demonstrations, but had coached students in techniques of nonviolence. His fellow
students and most of the divinity school faculty signed a protest statement. Southern
School News, April, 296o, p. 5, Col. 4-.
2s Id., March 5, 196o, p. 20, col. 2.
.13 Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 20, 2960, § A, p. 2, col. 6.
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In Memphis, the demonstrations were centered around the library
and art gallery. Negroes were permitted to use the reference room at
the main library, but not the reading room. On Saturday, March I9,
thirty-six Negro students went into the reading room. They and a
Negro newspaper editor were arrested and convicted for disorderly
conduct on the allegation that the students disturbed other persons when
interviewed by the editor. The editor testified he "spoke in low tones"
and was covering the story." 4 The City Art Gallery is open to Negroes
only on Thursdays. Seven Negro students entered the art gallery on a
Tuesday and asked to see a special exhibit. They were directed to it
and were examining the pictures when the police arrived and arrested
them for "loitering" when they refused to leave as directed." 5  The
next day, a two-week cooling off period was agreed upon to allow time
for efforts to settle racial grievances.116
io. Texas
The demonstrations in Texas resulted in extremes-either of vio-
lence or of peaceful settlement.
The sit-ins began in Houston, mostly by Negro students from Texas
Southern University, with immediate repercussions. A Negro drug-
store porter was slashed by a white youth with a knife, 17 and three
masked white men seized another Negro, flogged him with a chain,
carved the insignia of the Ku Klux Klan on his chest and stomach, and
hanged him by his knees in an oak tree. The sit-in demonstrations then
moved from the lunch counters near the Texas Southern University
campus to the downtown drug stores.11
In the east Texas city of Marshall, demonstrations began on March
27, when twenty-five Negro college students were arrested when they
sought service at three lunch counters.1 On March 30, about fifty-five
Negroes were arrested for demanding to be fed at white lunch counters.
While the first group was being fingerprinted, photographed, and
charged with unlawful assembly, about 2oo Negroes gathered near the
courthouse and began to sing "God Bless America" and similar songs.
The firemen then arrived and turned powerful streams of water into
the crowd. Hoses drenched West Houston Street, which leads to
... N.Y. Times, March z2, 596o, p. z5, col. x.
.../d., March 23, 196o, p. 1S, col. 3.
"
1 Id., March 24, 596o, p. 25, col. 1.
" Id., March 8, i96o, p. 21, col. i.
"
8 Id., March 9, 5960, p. 59, col. 1.
119Id., March 29, 5960, p. 28, col. 2.
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Marshall's two all-Negro colleges. 20 On April i, there were further
student demonstrations, and forty-nine students were arrested for "un-
lawful assembly to deprive a man of the right to do business." Bail was
set at 700 dollars each, and twenty-six of the girls, including the Chair-
man of the National Student Council of the YWCA, were confined for
twenty-six hours in a single ten-by-twelve foot cell, without room to
sit down.126a A Negro professor was fired for his part in the demonstra-
tion, and on March 31, Governor Price Daniel asked the head of the
Texas Department of Public Safety "to find out whether Communists
were behind the Negro demonstrations at Marshall."''
In contrast with the situations in Houston and Marshall is that in
San Antonio. Through the intervention of the Rev. C. Don Baugh,
executive director of the San Antonio Council of Churches, downtown
dime stores agreed to serve Negroes. Few Negroes took advantage
of the situation, "but as they requested service there was no incident.
Whites accepted the new situation calmly."' 22 In Galveston, too, lunch
counters were voluntarily integrated, and Negroes started eating beside
whites without incident.1 2
2
a
i i. Virginia
The demonstrations began in Richmond with a sit-in at the restau-
rant in Thalhimer's department store. Thirty-three participants were
arrested, which prompted a picket line urging a boycott.123 The Vir-
ginia legislature, then in session, enacted three antitrespassing laws
aimed at the sit-down protests. They provide maximum penalties of
I,OOO dollars fine and twelve months in jail. 124  These statutes did not
punish picketing, and the line of protesters continued outside Thal-
himer's.Y5
The protest demonstration ran a course similar to that in other
states. It spread to variety and drug stores, first in Richmond, then
in Suffolk, Portsmouth, 26 Petersburg,'27 Hampton, Newport News,
'Id., March 31, 1960, P.I, col. 2.
... National Student Councils of the YMCA and YWCA release, April- 6, i96o.
." N.Y. Times, April 1, 1960, p. 1, col. 4-
12 Id., March zo, i96o, p. I, col. 2.
" Id., April 6, 196o, p. x, col. 8.
id U., February 24, 1960, p. 36, col. 7.1 4, February 26, 196o, p. 8, col. 3.
Id., February 28, 196o, p. 45, col. 4.
"
8 Id., March 4, 296o, p. II, col. 1.
'"
7 Id., March 8, 196o, p. 2i., col. 1.
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Arlington, and elsewhere.1 28  There was no use of tear gas or fire hoses,
although there were several isolated fist fights between demonstrators
and white hecklers; and in Newport News, the officials patrolled the
picket lines with police K9 corps dogs. 2 9 As elsewhere, there were
boycotts, although in Petersburg, the participants called it "a secession
of Negro patronage."'13 As in Memphis, Tennessee, Negroes were
arrested and convicted for trespass in the public library. Fourteen
Negroes, including three children, entered the Petersburg public library
and went to the white section. When asked to leave, they refused and
were arrested. Bonds were set at i,ooo dollars each.13'
In Suffolk, the Woolworth store opened its lunch counter on a
service-to-all, stand-up basis. The counter was jammed with Negro
patrons on :the first day, but thereafter, their number declined sharply. 182
"The determination that underlies the movement has been demon-
strated from Alabama to Virginia," comments the New York Times.
"Negroes have risked fines and jail sentences, attacks from angry whites
and, in at least one case, possible death at the hands of a mob.' n 3'
What is behind the demonstrations? The New York Times sug-
gests that "the militancy of the Southern Negro lies in a new-found
belief that only through his own efforts can he achieve full citizenship
status. There is frustration over the promise of democracy, made but
never quite fulfilled. There is patience worn thin by years of fruitless
waiting. There is the catalyst provided by the youths who refuse to
accept a future limited by race rather than ability.313
What is the significance of the demonstrations? Minimally, again
to quote the New York Times, they give the lie to two cherished beliefs:
"The first is that the Southern white, and he alone, truly understands
the Negro. The second depicts most Negroes as advocates of the prac-
tice that goes by the name of separate but equal." 13 4
What lies in the future?3" In many southern communities, the
128 Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 20, 596o, § A, p. 2, col. 6.
12, Id., March 27, r96o, § C, p. Iz, col. 2.
1.0 N.Y. Times, March z, ig6o, p. Z5, col. x.
121 Id., March 8, x960, p. 2X, col. 1.
12 Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March zo, 296o, § A, p. 2, col. 7.
.... N.Y. Times, March 13, 296o, p. 6, col. 5.
122 Ibid.
.. I'd., March 6, 296o, p. 3, col. I.
25A Negro leader has put it this way: "The segregationists now face some hard
alternatives: They can continue to seek to maintain segregated facilities. In this event
they must live with discord or themselves initiate, and be responsible for, violence with
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mayors have appointed committees to "bridge the gap" between the
races and attempt to achieve a solution to the problem. The Greensboro
(North Carolina) Daily News praised the mayor of that community
for appointing such a committee, and editorialized as follows:136
The lunch counter demonstrations do constitute a grave problem. Like
Gandhi's passive resistance movement in India, they are growing. The white
South's first impulse, like Great Britain's, is to slap them down hard. That
might work if there were no justice on the sit-downers' side. But that is not
the case....
The alternative, if nothing is done, is more commotion. Greensboro,
where the trouble started, would be an excellent place to end it....
Greensboro, through its Mayor's Committee, has a chance to chart a
practical and reasonable course for the South. It need not be all or nothing.
It might be accommodation somewhere between. Without a plan avoiding
two dangers there can only be more trouble for everybody.
A North Carolina judge suggests that "the key to this problem is to
be found not in the law but in religion. The answer here depends upon
which is the stronger-racial prejudice or love of one's neighbor. Both
are strong in North Carolina today.-"W 6a
This writer is in agreement that the "key" to the problem is not to
be found in the law. But, as in the school-segregation situations, the
courts are under obligation to deal with the problems as brought before
them, and the following pages are concerned with the legal issues of
the demonstrations.
II
THE LEGAL ISSUEs
The events briefly highlighted above have given rise to the follow-
ing types of legal problems: (i) Can participants in a boycott, or those
who picket to bring about a boycott, be punished for violating antitrust
all its evil consequences. They may close the facilities as they have done in many
places. But this will not end the movement; rather, it will spread to libraries, public
parks, schools, and the like, and these too will have to be closed, thus depriving both
white and Negro of necessary cultural and recreational institutions. This would be a
step backward for the whole of society. Or finally, they can accept the principle of
equality. In this case they still have two alternative approaches. They may make the
facilities equally bad for both white and Negro or equally good. Thus finally simply
logic and justice in their own interests should direct them to the only acceptable solu-
tion-to accept equality and maintain it on the best level for both races." King, The
Burning Truth In The South, The Progressive, May 196o, p. lo.
... Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, March 21, 196o, p. 4, col. z.
.... Address by Special Judge J. Braxton Craven, Jr., of the N. C. Superior Court
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or other laws designed to protect merchants from wrongful interference
with their business opportunities? (2) Can the demonstrators, although
the demonstrations are peaceful and orderly, be punished for breach
of the peace or incitement to riot when the demonstrations are carried
out in a volatile atmosphere where the slightest spark might provoke
the white hecklers to violence? (3) Can student demonstrators be ex-
pelled from school because of participation in efforts to secure what they
believe are their rights? (4) Can state trespass laws constitutionally be
applied to demonstrators who invade the premises of dime stores against
the direction of the store owners? These problems, in this context,
are unique, untried, and unsettled. Answers cannot be given with cer-
tainty. However, it seems appropriate to define and delineate the
problems, suggest some lines of inquiry and analogize the existing case
law relevant to the discussion.
A. Boycotts, Antitrust Laws, and Tortious Interference with
Prospective Business Relations
Nationally, 37 regionally,13 and locally, 39 the NAACP and other
groups have called for a boycott or a "secession" of patronage of those
stores which refuse to serve Negroes while seated. In Marshall, Texas,
sixteen students were charged with "preventing commerce" when they
sat down at an all-white lunch counter. 4  In Nashville, Tennessee,
eighty students were charged with conspiring to violate the state trade
and commerce law by helping to direct lunch-counter demonstrations.14'
In North Carolina, a judge suggested that the demonstrators might be
punished under the common-law doctrine that makes it illegal to con-
spire to injure anyone's person, property or profession. 42  How valid
are these arrests and suggestions?
The federal antitrust laws make it illegal for anyone by way of con-
tract, trust, conspiracy or otherwise to restrain interstate trade."'4 A
boycott, black-list, or concerted refusal to deal with the products of a
to the Morganton Pilot Club, Chapel Hill (N.C.) Weekly, April zS, 196o, § B, p. 4,
col. 3. The judge concluded in his speech that "no matter who stands there, the ground
is said to be level at the foot of the Cross." Ibid.
1""N.Y. Times, March 23, 196o, p. 8, col 3.
... Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, March 15, 196o, § A, p. 2, col. 8.
... N.Y. Times, Feb. z4, 196o, p. 36, COl 7-
1
"'Id., April 4, 196o, p. 37, col. z.
"'Id., March 5, x96o, p. 1o, Col. 2.
... Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald, April 5, 196o, § B, p. 8, col. 2.
143The Sherman Act § i, z6 Stat. 2o9 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
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business rival is an illegal restraint of trade under the federal antitrust
laws.14 4  The Sherman and other antitrust acts, however, were designed
to protect commercial competition and consequently prohibit only those
restraints of trade imposed by competitors in the market place. Thus,
the Supreme Court has held that a sit-down strike by a union is not
illegal under the Sherman Act, even though the strike restrains the
interstate movement of the employer's products, because "this effect on
competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of
price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act."' 45
Many states have adopted laws similar to the federal antitrust
statutes.46 Some states, including North Carolina, in addition, have
specifically made boycotts illegal, but only when the target is a "business
rival" and only when the purpose of the boycott is "to fix the price of
value when the competition is removed."' 47  These state statutes
have not been construed to deprive merchants or the public of the right
to refuse to purchase goods from persons with whom they are not in
direct economic competition. 148 The existing judicial interpretations of
the federal and state antitrust statutes, therefore, indicate that neither
the dime-store demonstrators nor those who organize or participate in
boycotts of the dime stores are violating the statutory laws relating to
restraint of trade. 49
" Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. i (1945)5 United States v. Women's
Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 46o (.949).
""Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).
1"" North Carolina statutes declare illegal "every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1 (1950). For similar state statutes see TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-ioi
(1955); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7426 (1951); VA. CODE ANN. § 59-20
(1950).
1"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5() (1950).
14a Rice v. AsheviUe Ice Company, 2o4 N.C. 768, 169 S.E. 707 (933) (manufac-
turers of ice refused in concert to sell to a retailer) 5 Lineberger v. Colonial Ice Co., zzo
N.C. 444, 17 S.E.2d 502 (9g.i) (same)5 Dallas Gen. Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., 156
Tex. 408, 295 S.W.zd 873 (x956) (it is not a conspiracy in restraint of trade for work-
men to agree to strike and peacefully picket their employer). Cf. Association of Bailey
v. Master Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 5z S.W. 853 (Y899) (bylaws requiring all members
of a plumbers association to purchase only from designated dealers). The North Caro-
lina court has gone so far as to sustain the legality of an agreement by cafe owners to
boycott salesmen who sold products to a rival cafe owner. This agreement, said the
court, "without any evidence of malice, fraud or coercion, did not give rise to the cause
of action alleged." McNeill v. Hall, 22o N.C. 73, i6 S.E.2d 456 (i94-).
"" Quaere, do the store owners who meet and jointly decide to follow a policy of
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Apart from problems arising under the statutory laws as enacted by
the legislatures, there are problems arising under the common law as
developed by judges on a case-to-case basis. Conduct intended to inter-
fere with prospective economic advantage and business opportunities
may be an actionable tort for which the injured person may recover
money damages. 150 Liability usually turns upon the ultimate purpose
or object which the defendant seeks to advance, and the legitimacy there-
of. The decisions concerning picketing, black-lists, boycotts, and other
forms of concerted economic pressure in other areas of social conduct
indicate that the dime-store boycotters are not liable financially for any
decrease in trade which might follow their actions.
Boycotts of the dime stores are not unlike the boycotts of movies
that have gone on in the past years. The Legion of Decency, through
the local clergy, urges all Roman Catholics to refrain from viewing
movies that are morally offensive. Recent movies that were classified
as morally offensive include The Moon Is Blue, The French Line, The
Soo of Sinbad, and Baby Doll. The Legion of Decency is not the only
group that seeks the boycott of films offensive to the group it represents.
The NAACP has often objected to showings of Birth of a Nation, which
deals with the reconstruction period in the South. Jewish groups ob-
jected to the showing of Oliver Twist, members of the Ku Klux Klan
picketed Island in the Sun, and the American Legion picketed Charlie
Chaplin's Limelight so effectively in Jersey City that patrons could not
refusing sit-down service to Negroes violate the antitrust laws? The Sherman Act does
not restrict "the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (199). The
Sherman Act does, however, restrict the right of a merchant to reject customers when
acting in concert with others. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (196o).
This does not resolve the issue, however, as the federal antitrust laws are only ap-
plicable if there is (s) an agreement or conspiracy (see Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. zoS (1939) (unanimity of reaction to proposal jointly made sufficient
to establish conspiracy)) 5 (z) to restrain interstate trade (see Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (restriction of sugar-beet
acreage restricts interstate trade))5 (3) to an extent "appreciable" (see United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 2 18 (1947) (monopolizing replacements of 5,ooo taxicabs
violates Sherman Act)) ; (4) in the appropriate area of competition (see United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (downtown theaters were an area of
competition distinct from movie exhibition business generally)); International Boxing
Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (promotion of championship boxing
bouts was separate and distinct from business of promoting boxing bouts generally).
... PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (2d ed. 1955).
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get to the theater to purchase tickets. While the decisions are few,
"picketing a theater while an objectionable motion picture is being
shown ... seems designed primarily to warn others of an apprehended
evil, and is unquestionably privileged .... "I"
Boycotts of the dime stores are not unlike the boycotts conducted by
various citizens' groups to achieve ends and objectives deemed vital to
them. The right of citizens to picket for the purpose of compelling
store owners to cease exercising their lawful right of doing business on
Sunday has been sustained, even though the picketing resulted in a
substantial loss of business.' Similarly, the right of citizens to picket
with signs reading that the meat sold by the store was not Kosher has
been upheld, despite a resulting loss of business. 53 These and other
cases hold that the right to picket peacefully, under the guaranty of
free speech, extends to a dispute between a businessman and any citizen
or group of citizens who may differ with him on a question of business
policy.'5
4
Labor unions traditionally use a variety of economic weapons to
force employer compliance with their demands. These weapons include
the boycott, 5 the picket line, and the "Unfair" or "We Do Not Pa-
tronize" list." 6 The early attitude of the courts toward the unions
was that they were outlaw organizations, and their activities were crimi-
nal conspiracies to disrupt the social order. This point of view has long
since given way to a recognition that unions are legitimate and socially
desirable. 57 Since 194o, labor union picketing has been protected as an
exercise of constitutional free speech 58 when carried on in a lawful
... Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326, 366 (1957), citing Watch Tower Bible & Tract
Soc'y v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, ix A.2d i47 (1940).
"'Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 81 P.2d 19o (1938).
1"' Rosman v. United Strictly Kosher Butchers, 298 N.Y. Supp. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
1. Note, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 296 (1949).
... SMITH, LABOR LAW 217 (1953).
... The NLRB has noted that "the unfair listing of a primary employer is a tradi-
tional weapon used by labor organizations in direct support of a primary labor dispute"
and that it is designed to put pressure on the named employer "by diverse means, in-
cluding withdrawal of services from him by union members . . . , refusal by such
employees to accept his employment, product boycott by union employees and . . . the
public . . . , sympathetic refusal by union employers to trade with him, and the dis-
concerting effect of widespread publicity of the labor dispute." Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 756 (949).
"" PROSSER, TORTS 739 (2d ed. 1955).
1""Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (940).
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manner 5 ' and for lawful objectives. 10 The "primary boycott" and
use of "unfair lists" now go unchallenged.' 0 '
Picketing and boycott activities by Negro groups to end "Jim Crow"
employment policies have been sustained on analogy to labor union
picketing activity. The United States Supreme Court has noted that :102
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part
of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal of discriminations
against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important
to those concerned as fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employ-
ment can be to trade or craft unions or any form of labor organization or
association. Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed
more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the
ground of union affiliation.
The few state courts that have faced the problem are in agreement.
A New York court refused to enjoin the picketing of a movie house by
Negroes with the statement that: "The right of an individual or group
of individuals to protest in a peaceable manner against injustice or op-
pression, actual or merely fancied, is one to be cherished and not to be
proscribed in any well-ordered society.' 0 3
A Pennsylvania county judge, in a similar situation, said: "Unques-
tionably the respondents, or anyone else in fact, are privileged to request
the management of a theater to employ a Negro machine operator and
further they may lawfully urge the patrons of such a theater to do what-
ever they lawfully may to let the management know their feeling on
the subject."'0 4
The analogies above seem to afford tort immunity to the Negro
dime-store demonstrators. (I) The self-interest of the Negro dime-
store demonstrators in ending racial discrimination at the lunch counter
is as great as that of those who picket and boycott movie houses in the
hope of preventing others from viewing films deemed objectionable.' 05
.. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 311 U.S.
287 (1941)-
... See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 0949).
-
81 Note, 6z YALE L.J. iiix (1953).
... New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938). The
Court here reversed a federal court injunction against the picketing on the theory that
a labor dispute" existed between the parties within the meaning of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. See also Hughes v. Superior Court, '339 U.S. 46o (1950).
..
3 Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, iz N.Y.S.zd 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
1. Stevens v. West Philadelphia Youth Civic League, 34 Pa. D. & C. 6z2, 617
(County Ct. 1939).
... The degree of self, family, group, and public interest in the picketing is a factor
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(2) If there is any distinction between the Negro demonstrator's picket-
ing and that of labor unions, it would seem that nonlabor picketing
should have the preferred position. Labor unions are organized, disci-
plined, and possess economic and moral sanctions adequate to control
their members, whereas the picketing by Negro students is substantially
free of coercive aspects and remains the principal means by which they
can communicate facts and ideas respecting important social issues.
(3) The analogy between the two cases of racial picketing to end dis-
criminatory employment practices and to end discriminatory service is
self-evident.
B. Breach of the Peace, Incitement to Riot, and the Right
to Free Speech
In Alabama, Negro students were threatened with arrest for breach
of the peace when they asked for service in the courthouse snack
shop,'0 and thirty-two Negro students were convicted of disorderly
conduct for participation in an on-campus mass protest rally.0 7 In
Arkansas" 8 and in Florida, 6 9 students were arrested for breach of the
peace for refusing to leave store counters when requested, and in South
Carolina for requesting service.'7 ' Also in South Carolina, some 350
students were arrested for breach of the peace when they sought to
conduct a protest prayer meeting on the courthouse steps. 17' In'
Memphis, Tennessee, Negroes who entered a white library were arrested
for disorderly conduct, 7 ' and Negroes who entered the art gallery were
arrested for loitering.7 8  These arrests raise a serious legal problem:
Can persons espousing unpopular views be arrested because their activi-
in determining liability for interference with the prospective economic benefit of others.
PROSSER, ToRT 735 (zd ed. 1955).
... Text accompanying note 48 supra. The federal courts have held that courthouse
cafeterias cannot discriminate against Negro patrons, even when leased to private en-
trepreneurs. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (Sth Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 924 (957).
... See text accompanying note 54- supra. The right to peaceful demonstrations is
well recognized. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.
496 (93).
.6 See text accompanying note 59 supra. The legality of sit-ins is discussed below.
"o See text accompanying note 61 supra.
270 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
... See text accompanying note io5 supra.
172 See text accompanying note 114 supra. The federal courts have held that libraries
receiving state money cannot discriminate against Negroes, even though the library is
privately originated and privately managed. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, x49
F.zd 212 ( 4 th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (945).
173 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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ties, in and of themselves peaceful and orderly, arouse the resentment
of others who thereby engage in lawless conduct? Five cases, two state
and three federal, shed some light on this problem.
In People v. Barman, 174 the defendants were convicted of a breach
of the peace for marching through the city streets with red flags after
notice that the display of such flags would cause riots. In upholding
the convictions, the Michigan Supreme Court said this: "The question
here is not whether the defendants have in general a right to parade
with a red flag. It is this: Had they such right, when they knew that
the natural and inevitable consequence was to create riot and disorder?"
The court answered in the negative: "Their right to display a red flag
was subordinate to the right of the public. They had no right to dis-
play it when the natural and inevitable consequence was to destroy the
public peace and tranquillity."
Relying on the authority of the above Michigan decision, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Cole,175 affirmed the conviction of
Ku Klux Klan leaders for inciting a riot by attempting to hold a meeting
on a leased field in a neighborhood where their appearance aroused
community opposition and hostility. The Ku Klux Klan "had been
preaching racial dissension and hatred and conducting cross-burnings
for the purpose of frightening certain Indian families in the commu-
nity" of Robeson County. The announced meeting had received wide-
spread publicity, and the Sheriff earlier had warned the Klansmen that
there might be trouble. On the night in question, several Klansmen
arrived carrying arms, and Indians, many armed, lined up across the
road from the field where the meeting was scheduled. When the Klan
spokesman arrived, he asked the Sheriff for protection, and the Sheriff
replied that "if I had one hundred and fifty men, I couldn't keep the
Indians of Robeson County from coming in on that field." The Sheriff
did call for additional support, and nine deputies and about fifteen mem-
bers of the Highway Patrol responded to his call. Before they arrived,
however, several hundred shots were fired, and a news reporter and a
soldier by-stander were slightly injured. The Klansmen were then
arrested. Their conviction for inciting a riot was upheld, the court
holding that the armed presence of the Klansmen "would be calculated
to cause a breach of the peace.., in the community."
The United States Supreme Court has faced the problem of peaceful
speech to a hostile audience on two recent occasions. Terminiello v.
174 154 Mich. 15o, 117 N.W. 589 (1908).
"'State v. Cole, z49 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.zd 732 (1959), 38 N.C.L. REv. 274.
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Chicago'0 sustained the value of unhampered discussion as against the
value of public order. Terminiello gave a speech in a Chicago audi-
torium under the auspices of the Christian Veterans of America, an
organization opposed to various racial minority groups. The meeting
commanded considerable public attention, and a crowd of over a thou-
sand persons gathered to protest. Terminiello was convicted under a
city breach-of-the-peace ordinance that permitted punishment for speech
that "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction with
the statement that: "[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high pur-
pose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.' 7 7
Within two years, however, the Supreme Court changed course in
Feiner v. New York.'78 A street-corner speaker gave the impression
to a mixed audience that he was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people
against the whites. The crowd was restless and there was some pushing,
shoving, and milling around. A policeman "stepped in to prevent it
from resulting in a fight" and asked the speaker to step down. The
speaker refused, and was arrested for disorderly conduct. The Supreme
Court sustained his subsequent conviction with these remarks :171
This Court respects, as it must, the interest of the community in main-
taining peace and order on its streets. We cannot say that the preservation
of that interest here encroaches on the constitutional rights of this petitioner.
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a
hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker, and are also mindful
of the possible danger of giving overzealous police officials complete discretion
to break up otherwise lawful public meetings .... But we are not faced here
with such a situation. It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as
an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say
that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion
and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of
the peace.
There is one final case that should be mentioned, Seller v. John-
son,180 as it demonstrates that the police must be vigilant peace officers
for the unpopular speaker as well as for the hostile audience. The
Ila 3 3 7 U.S. 1 (1949).
17d I. at 4.
178340 U.S. 315 (1951-)
1.. Id. at 320-21.
163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
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Jehovah's Witnesses in Iowa planned a series of four Sunday meetings
in the Lacona city park. The speaker at the first meeting was harassed
and interfered with, but succeeded in delivering his Bible lecture on
"Religion as a Peacemaker." At the second meeting, there were nu-
merous fist fights, with bloody faces, black eyes, broken glasses, and torn
clothing. The Mayor prohibited the third meeting, and the Sheriff,
with the assistance of about ioo special deputies, blockaded the city
against the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses then filed suit in the
federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 187118' to enjoin inter-
ference with their contemplated meeting. The requested relief was
granted. The court pointed out that the ioo persons deputized to block-
ade the highways could have been utilized to preserve order at the park
and stated that :18
To secure the rights of free speech and assembly against abridgment, it
is essential not to yield to threats of disorder. Otherwise these rights of the
people to meet and of speakers to address the citizens so gathered, could not
merely be abridged, but could be destroyed by the action of a small minority
of persons hostile to the speaker or to the views he would be likely to express.
What do these cases mean when applied to the concrete situations
that now exist because of the dime-store demonstrations? They mean
that demonstrators who persist in picketing or mass-prayer meetings in
the face of a riotous situation that the police cannot quell constitution-
ally can be convicted for breach of the peace and kindred crimes. This
was the situation in the earliest days of the Chattanooga demonstrations,
when the fire department was called upon to quell the mobs that at one
time numbered in the thousands. These cases also mean that the police
cannot use the pretext of an emergency situation to prohibit peaceful
demonstrations. This seems to be the situation in Montgomery, where
students were arrested for participation in an on-campus mass meeting,
and in Memphis, where students were arrested for entering a public
library and a public art museum. Somewhere in between these two
extreme situations a line must be drawn that gives full recognition to
both the constitutional rights of peaceful protest and the right of a city
to maintain peace and order. In drawing this line, it is to be hoped that
the courts will recognize that governmental units "can as a practical
matter prevent violent interferences with speech if they wish. Suitable
preventive and protective steps are most likely to be taken if the police
... REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
3S2 163 F.zd at 881 quoting from Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U.s. 496, 68o (1939) ( amici curiae brief).
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are firmly told that a speaker cannot be charged with the crime of in-
citing a disturbance of the peace unless the police themselves have first
done everything possible to protect the speechmaking."'
C. School Expulsions and Off-Campus Political Activities
Student demonstrators have been expelled from Alabama State Col-
lege, from Southern University in Louisiana, and from Vanderbilt Uni-
versity in Tennessee. Expulsion from college'8 4 is to many a far more
serious sanction than the fines generally levied on those convicted under
the trespass laws. 85 These reprisals for student participation in off-
campus political, social, and economic activities raise serious problems
under the fourteenth amendment. 8 6
The courts have jurisdiction by way of mandamus or otherwise to
review the legality of school expulsions and will order reinstatement
when the expulsion is made pursuant to regulations that are unreason-
able, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when the expulsion infringes upon
some constitutional right."' In applying this rule, courts have sustained
... GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 61-62 (1960).
18a The Mississippi court recently held that a financially-able father can be compelled
to provide college-education funds for his seventeen-year-old daughter, even though his
divorced wife has the child's custody. The court remarked that the duty to provide a
college education is a duty that the parent "not only owes to his child, but to the state
as well, since the stability of our government must depend upon a well-equipped, a
well-trained, and a well-educated citizenship." Pass v. Pass, 118 So.zd 769, 773 (Miss.
196o).
185 The fine levied by the North Carolina courts for trespass in the Durham ice cream
parlor was $1o.oo. State v. Clyburn, 24-7 N.C. 455, 1oi S.E.2d 295 (1958). The
fine levied by the Virginia courts for trespass in the Richmond bus terminal cafe was
also $io.oo. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, i96o, p. 18, col. 2. Of late, however, the fines are
much more punitive. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
188 Among the liberties guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is "the right of the
individual .... to acquire useful knowledge." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). The state has no power to standardize its children, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (19,5); or to compel uniformity of thought in the public schools.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
87 The Legal Status of the Public School Pupil, z6 N.E.A. Research Bull. 28
(948). A private educational institution is generally free to select whom it will admit
as students, but once having admitted them, the institution cannot expel students except
for reasons and by procedures set forth in its charter and catalogue. A Pennsylvania
court held that it had no jurisdiction when suit was filed by an expelled student from
a private college whose catalogue announced that it "reserves the right to exclude at
any time students whose conduct or academic standing it regards as undesirable." Barker
v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. I2I, 122 Ad. 220 (1923). The New York
courts, however, hold that a private institution cannot dismiss a student without reason
or arbitrarily, even though the catalogue reserved to the institution "the right to require
the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it." An-
thony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928). A Florida
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expulsions for violation of regulations banning the use of cosmetics and
objectionable clothing,'88 the smoking of cigarettes, 80 the serving of
liquor to other students,190 and marriage.' These and similar regula-
tions were deemed reasonably related to the maintenance of a proper
atmosphere within the classroom or on the campus. 92
A good deal of the "expulsion" litigation has concerned the reason-
ableness of regulations prohibiting membership in high school and col.
lege fraternities. 93  Most courts have held such regulations "not un-
reasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory and ...not vulnerable to any
constitutional objection."' 4 A Missouri court, on the other hand, held
that the school had no right to prohibit pupils from participation in
social activities outside of school hours unless the activities were detri-
mental to the operation and control of the school. Membership in
fraternities was held to have no such effect.19'
These cases point up a line drawn by the courts: "the teacher stands
in loco parentis only within the sphere of his duty as a teacher"; the
parent is responsible for disciplining because of off-campus, out-of-school
misbehavior. These limits on the disciplinary authority of educational
institutions were carved out in the landmark case of State ex rel. Clark
v. Osborne,' decided in 1887. A school regulation prohibited attend-
ance at social events without the permission of the school authorities.
A sixteen-year-old girl student attended a party with the permission of
her father, but without permission of the school. She was expelled and
court held that a student can recover damages from a private institution for "wanton and
mnalicious expulsion." John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 51o, 102 So. 637 (1924).
"It is uniformly held in the United States that the relation between a college and its
students is a contractual one . . . .but in practice courts interfere only where there
has been a palpable abuse of the wide discretion possessed by the authorities." Note,
Right to Dismiss Student Without Stating Cause, 77 U. PA. L. Rav. 694-95 (z929).
's9 Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, z58 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
.
9 Tanton v. McKenney, zz6 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 51o (.924).
190 State v. Clapp, 8. Mont. 2oo, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (193).
191 State v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.zd 57 (959).
1. It goes without saying that the courts have sustained expulsion for cheating on
examinations, People v. Trustees of Univ. of Ill., zo Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.zd 635
(1956) ; for giving false testimony in a faculty investigation of a disciplinary disturb-
ance, Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (19o2); and
for creating a disturbance on the school bus. In re Neal, z64 N.Y.S.zd 549 (-957).
...A recent illustration of a regulation banning membership in fraternities whose
constitutions discriminate on basis of race and religion is found in Webb v. State Univ.
of N.Y., iz5 F. Supp. 92o (N.D.N.Y. 954), where the regulation was sustained.
' Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, z46 P.zd 566 (1952). See generally
The Legal Status of the Public School Pupil, z6 N.E.A. Research Bull. 28, 29 (1948).
... Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (922).
Igo 74 Mo. App. 309 (x887).
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brought a mandamus suit for reinstatement. The requested relief was
granted, the court commenting that parents may either place their chil-
dren under the control of other persons or leave them free to control
themselves, and the choice is for the discretion of the parents. 197
Despite the decisions that educational institutions can expel students
only for activities that reasonably relate to the academic routine or for
student conduct that infringes on school related affairs, there are three
isolated decisions that sustain the right of the college (two of them pri-
vate institutions) to expel because of off-campus behavior that reflects
adversely on the institution. During World War I, the New York
courts refused redress to a Columbia University student expelled for an
off-campus antiwar speech in which he urged resistance to the draft."' 8
During the "cold war" following World War II, the Michigan court,
without written opinion, refused redress to a student expelled for spon-
soring an off-campus meeting at which an indicted Communist leader
was the principal speaker.'99 Just recently, the Florida court refused
redress to a student expelled from the University of Miami School of
Education for writing a letter to a newspaper in which he was "fanatical
in his [favorable] views as to atheism."200  The above three situations
have little in common with the current expulsions for participation in
the dime-store demonstrations. Violation of trespass laws, for example,
cannot fairly be equated with urging war-time resistence to the draft,
conduct which the reviewing court deemed closely akin to treason.
Much closer on point are the "flag salute" cases, for in each situation, the
student claims a privilege to enforce a constitutional right, the exercise
of which is made illegal by state law.
The flag salute requirement swept the country during World War I
by state laws, state education department regulations, and local school
board rules. West Virginia typically2' expelled students who refused
to join in the flag salute and thereafter sent them to reformatories
maintained for criminally-inclined juveniles. Parents of such children
were prosecuted criminally for causing delinquency. 202 In brief, refusal
to salute the flag was a crime carrying with it the additional sanction of
expulsion from school. This situation continued until members of the
I ELLIOTT & CHAMBEIS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 26 (1936).
... Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 167 N.Y. Supp. zoz (Sup. Ct. z17).
... Zarichny v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 17 U.S.L. WEEK 3374, cert. den. 338 U.S.
Sx6 (i949).
200 Robinson v. University of Miami, 1oo So. 2d 44. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
.0 For a general survey of the state statutes and decisions, see The Legal Status of
the Public-School Pupil, z6 N.E.A. Research Bull. 28 (948).
202 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 6z9-30 (I943).
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Jehovah's Witnesses brought a suit to prevent the West Virginia State
Board of Education from requiring their children to salute the flag.
The Supreme Court put a halt to the expulsions. Pointing out that the
fourteenth amendment protects students from school board action in-
fringing on the Bill of Rights, here, freedom of religion, the Court
said: "Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction
and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed,
party, or faction. 2 03
If the fourteenth amendment requires a "hands off" school board
policy in a religious controversy, it requires a similar policy when stu-
dents peacefully picket and demonstrate to achieve desired social objec-
tives. Expulsion for participation in sit-ins makes the school authorities
a forbidden "partisan or enemy" of a "class, creed, party, or faction,"
removes the student from the best influence of democracy, and distorts
his sense of justice and faith in freedom.20 4  This is not good. As re-
cently stated by the President of the Harvard University Board of
Overseers, a university :205
is not and must not become an aggregation of like-minded people all behaving
according to approved convention. It is a temple of the open-minded ...
the historical consequence of the mediaeval studium generale-a self-generated
guild of students or of masters accepting as grounds for entrance and dis-
missal only criteria relevant to the performance of scholarly duties.
D. Sit-Ins, Trespass Laws, and Unconstitutional State Action
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Students have been arrested under state trespass laws for picket-
ing on the privately-owned sidewalks of a Raleigh, North Carolina,
privately-owned shopping center, 06 for sit-ins in lunchrooms at the
203 1d. at 637.
o" Note, 29 NB. L. REV. 485, 501 (950).
'0' Statement of Charles E. Wyzanski in support of proposition that "what faculty
members do outside their posts, we should leave to outside authority." Harvard Alumni
Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 36.
Some forty years earlier, President Lowell, of Harvard, repudiated the concept of
punishing a professor for off-campus extreme or injudicious actions with the statement
that "if a university or college censors what its professors may say, if it restrains them
from uttering something that it does not approve, it thereby assumes responsibility for
that which it permits them to say. This is logical and inevitable but it is a responsibility
which an institution of learning would be very unwise in assuming." 15 OFFICIAL
REGISTER OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 19-20 (1916).
... On April zz, 96o, the trespass charges were dismissed by Superior Court Judge
Jack Hooks on authority of Marsh v. Alabama, discussed at note zo9 infra. District
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Atlanta, Georgia, Court House and City Hall,2 '7 for sit-ins at the public
library in Petersburg, Virginia,208 and for sit-ins at various privately-
owned dime stores throughout the South.
The Supreme Court has held that a state cannot constitutionally
apply its trespass laws so as to punish a peaceful picketer for remaining
on privately-owned sidewalks of a privately-owned town against the
express orders of the town manager. 0 9 The federal courts of appeals
have held that states cannot discriminate against Negroes in libraries
receiving public financial support,210 or in lunchrooms located in public
buildings and under governmental control.211 It, therefore, seems clear
that the states cannot punish Negroes for entering an establishment
where the state cannot prohibit their presence.21 2  Less clear-indeed,
highly uncertain-is the right of a state to apply its trespass laws against
Negroes who remain in a privately-operated dime store after being told
to leave. The law on this point is open. In 19s8, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Clyburn 13 sustained a trespass conviction
against Negroes who refused to leave a Durham ice cream parlor when
so directed, but the litigants did not raise and the court did not pass
upon the contention that the "judicial" enforcement of the trespass
laws was state action forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. The
Solicitor L. V. Chalmers, Jr., supported the defense motion for a nonsuit and said he
had talked to Attorney General Wade Bruton about the cases and was told that the
Attorney General might concede error if the cases were to reach the State Supreme
Court. Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, April 23, 196o, p. i, col. i.
-0 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
2" See text accompanying note 131 supra.
20 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). "The 'business block' serves as the
community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area
and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail
the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the
Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces
such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature
clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Id. at 5o8.
21o Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 2 2 (4 th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 72, (1945).
"11Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.zd 922 (sth Cir., cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924
(-s).
212 State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958). Here, Negroes were
convicted for unlawful entry upon a golf course, despite a prior federal court order
enjoining racial discrimination. The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that
"if a party entering upon the land has a legal right to do so, of course he may not be
convicted of a trespass," but sustained the trespass conviction because the defendants had
failed to put the federal court order (which was not a proper subject for judicial notice)
into the record.
213 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958). The Negro litigants had to show un-
constitutional "state" action and put primary reliance on a city ordinance requiring
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issue not having been raised or passed upon, the decision does not consti-
tute a precedent when the question is finally brought to the fore.2 14 The
issue was raised in a subsequent Virginia bus terminal trespass case, and
the Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from the Virginia
Court's affirmance of conviction.21' As the Supreme Court may well
dispose of the case without reaching the issue under discussion,2 1  it is
appropriate to sketch the competing interests and outline the analogies
that might prove helpful in balancing them.
Historically, apart from "innkeepers," "public carriers," and the
like,2 17 the proprietor of a business can deal with his patrons as he likes-
segregation in restaurants. This would have been sufficient, but the litigants failed to
put the ordinance into evidence, and the courts, consistent with prior holdings, refused
to take judicial notice of its existence. The litigants additionally sought to prove "state"
action because (i) the ice cream parlor was licensed and periodically inspected by health
officials, and because (z) they had been arrested by a city policeman. The North Caro-
lina courts, consistent with the decisions in other jurisdictions, held that the mere fact
that an establishment is subject to state control through health and sanitation inspection
is not sufficient to make the establishment an agent of the state for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment. The North Carolina courts further held that the arrest by a police-
man is not "state" action. This is contrary to the rulings of many courts, both state
and federal. See text accompanying note 243 infra.
2" King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 135 (1928) United States v. More,
7 U.s. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805).
... Bruce Boynton, a Negro student at Howard University in Washington, D.C.,
went south on a bus. The bus stopped for a forty-minute layover at a terminal in
Richmond. Bloynton went into the restaurant for Negroes, which was crowded, and
then into the "white" restaurant. He was refused service and told to leave. When he
refused, he was arrested and convicted of trespass. The Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the $ 'o.oo fine without opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted
the petition for review that raised two contentions: first, that when the private restaurant
chose to invoke the power of the state by having Boynton prosecuted, the discrimination
against him became official, not private, and hence violated the fourteenth amendment)
second, segregation of terminal restaurants put an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Boynton v. Virginia, 361 U.S. 958 (196o); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, ±96o, p. 29, col. 6.
21" The Court might analogize bus terminal cafes to railroad dining cars and thereby
hold the discrimination illegal under the Interstate Commerce Act. Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (±95o). This would be in keeping with the Court's practice, when
faced with two alternative grounds for decision, to make its ruling on the basis of
statutory construction, which can be changed by Congress through the amendatory
process, rather than on the basis of the Constitution. Thus, if the Court conforms to
prior practice, it will not reach the constitutional issues unless it first rules that a bus
terminal cafe is not an "instrumentality" of commerce within the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
"' The common law imposed upon innkeepers, common carriers, wharfingers, and
others who operated businesses having the nature of a public utility the obligation to
serve all well-behaved customers without discrimination. In England, rejection of a
guest was long ago made a crime and remediable by suit for damages. The rule is
viable there today, as witnessed by a recent case in which a renowned West Indian Negro
cricketer recovered against a British hotel for refusal to serve him. Constantine v.
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denying service to some and not to others. This right to deny service
was recognized by the English common law21 and some fifty years ago
by the United States Supreme Court. 19 Such is the law except in the
twenty-six states that recently enacted laws prohibiting such discrimina-
tion.22 ° Recent illustrations are found in Williams v. Howard John-
son's Restaurant,22 ' where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
refused a Negro's request to order a restaurant to serve himi and Eaton
v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital,22 2 where
the same court refused a Negro doctor's request to order a hospital to
allow him admission so that he could treat his patients.
Clashing with the right of the private proprietor to refuse service
Imperial Hotels, Ltd., x K.B. 693, 2 All E.R. 171 (1944).
The obligation to serve all comers is due to the public nature of the business, 28
AM. JUR. Innkeepers 565 (1959), the need to protect the traveler in a day when the
solitary inn between cities was a necessity on long, dangerous journeys, and the unfair-
ness in permitting an innkeeper to pick and choose when he "allured travelers to his
tavern by holding himself out to the public as ready to entertain them." State v. Steele,
1o6 N.C. 766, 11 S.E. 478 (18go).
The various states are free to accept or reject this common-law doctrine. Delaware,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Florida have rejected it. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND
AMERICAN LAW 97 (1959). North Carolina has accepted it with the modification that
innkeepers are not required to accept guests "so objectionable to the patrons of the house,
on account of the race to which they belong, that it would injure the business to admit
them to all portions of the house." State v. Steele, supra at 782, i S.E. at 4.84. This
case was subsequently construed as holding that "innkeepers may assign them [white and
colored guests] separate apartments, provided they furnish equal accommodations to
both." McMillan v. School Comm., 107 N.C. 609, 614, 12 S.E. 330, 33 "(i89o).
The common-law obligation extended to hotel restaurants, but in Virginia, such
establishments need not serve casual Negro patrons. Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va.
94.3, 36 S.E.2d 9o6 (1946). See Note, Racial Discrimination by Restaurant, 46 VA. L.
REV. 123, 124 (196o).
.1. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (1845). Here, the
English Court of the Exchequer ruled that tickets for admission to a race track were
revocable at any time without return of the money paid and without assignment by the
owner of any reason for the revocation.
... Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (i913). The Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, held that a patron ejected from a race track with no
more force than necessary did not have a cause of action in trespass, assault, or false
arrest.
A few jurisdictions now allow recovery for wrongful rejection in the absence of
statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently gave $250 in damages for humiliation
and embarrassment to a ticket holder ejected from a theater because he was a cripple,
Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, 207 La. 835, 22 So. zd 189 (1945) 5 and a federal court
allowed recovery to a Negro when a hotel refused to honor his mail reservation,
Thomas v. Pick Hotels, 224. F.zd 664 (ioth Cir. 1955).
220 See GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 1o (1959); EMERSON
& HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTs IN THE UNITED STATES 14.13 (2d ed. x958).
1 268 F.2d 845 ( 4 th Cir. 1959). 222 261 F.ad 521 ( 4 th Cir. 1958).
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to patrons deemed undesirable is the right of all persons, Negroes in-
cluded, to acquire property. This right to "acquire and possess property
of every kind" is "fundamental to citizenship" and as such is guaranteed
by the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution. 223  It is
guaranteed against federal and state infringement by the due process
clauses of the Constitution.224 It is guaranteed by a federal statute223
now incorporated into the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 26
This fundamental right of equality in opportunity to acquire prop-
erty and the fruits of a civilized society has been deemed paramount to
the right of governments to district city housing on racial lines; 227 to
the right of state228 and federal 29 courts to enforce restrictive covenants
in real estate contracts; and to the right of state and city instrumentali-
ties to enforce segregation in city buses,210 city libraries, 231 public
auditoriums, 32 athletic events, 23 3 swimming pools, 234 beaches,
23 5 golf
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823) (a case arising under the privileges
and immunities clause of art. IV, § z of the Constitution), quoted with approval in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-76 (1873) (a case arising under the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment).
22. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), holding unconstitutional the Cali-
fornia Alien Land Law prohibiting Japanese from acquiring agricultural land.
222 Discussed at note z supra.
226 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). "If there is any one purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment that is wholly outside the realm of doubt, it is that the Amendment
was designed to bar States from denying to some groups, on account of their race or
color, any rights, privileges, and opportunities accorded to other groups." Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).
22. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (9%7) (city ordinance districting city on
racial lines to prevent race riots declared unconstitutional in suit brought by willing
white vendor to enforce contract of sale with Negro purchaser); City of Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (2930) (city ordinance districting city on racial lines to prevent
interracial marriage declared unconstitutional in suit brought by Negro who sought
freedom to seek opportunity to purchase a house in white neighborhood).
228 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
...Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (z948).
23 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) ; Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 2z4 F.zd 752 (4th Cir. 1955),
appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (2956).
221 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 249 F.2d 212 ( 4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945).
22 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 3 R.R.L.R. 323 (Arlington, Va., Cir. Ct. 1958).
222 Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. La. z958), aff'd 359
U.S. 533 (1959).
2.. Lonesome v. Maxwell, 22o F.2d 386 ( 4 th Cir.), aff'd sub nor. Mayor of Balti-
more City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (2955).
2"Tate v. Department of Conservation, z3x F.zd 625 (4th Cir.), cert. dened, 352
U.S. 838 (2956).
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courses,- 36 public housing,2 7 the sale of liquor,23 the sale of groceries,23 9
and the sale of food at a courthouse cafe.24°
This fundamental right to equality of opportunity in acquiring
property of every kind is said to be free only from "state" interference,
not from "private" discriminatory practices. This is the result of the
landmark Civil Rights Cases241 of 1883. There, theater owners, inn-
keepers, and the management of a railroad were indicted under the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which made it a federal crime for the owner of
public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement to
deny anyone the full and equal enjoyment of their accommodations.
The defendants had denied access to Negroes because of their race. The
Supreme Court dismissed the indictments on the ground that the Civil
Rights Act there in issue was beyond the constitutional authority granted
Congress by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The Court
held that these amendments were not intended to end discrimination by
private persons, but only to "provide modes of redress against the opera-
tion of state laws, and the action of state officials executive or judicial. '242
. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (.955).
"",Detroit Housing Comm'r v. Lewis, zz6 F.2d iSo (6th Cir. 1955).
28 De Angelis v. Board of Liquor License Comm'rs, z R.R.L.R. 370 (Baltimore,
Md., City Ct. 1955) (unconstitutional for the Baltimore Board of Liquor Commissioners
to grant liquor licenses for colored or white patronage only, but not both).
"People v. Moore, 5o Hun. 356, 3 N.Y. Supp. 159 (1888). Here, a mining
company directed an employee named Moore to keep various tradesmen out of the
privately-owned city where the company employees lived. Moore turned away a trades-
man named Snyder, and consequently was charged with assault and battery. The de-
fense raised was that Snyder was a trespasser. The New York court said this: "We
assume that if Snyder was a trespasser, the assault was justifiable, for no more force was
used than was reasonably necessary to eject him from the premises. But he was not a
trespasser. The streets leading to and about this village were made and opened by the
Burden Iron & Ore Company for such public use as was incident to the wants, con-
venience, and happiness of the people residing there. To the extent of this public use
the company subjected its private property to the law which regulates public rights. ...
By reserving the legal title to the thoroughfares of its village, it does not reserve auto-
cratic powers over the people residing along them. To prevent the members of its
community from buying supplies of Snyder, or of any tradesman not nominated by the
company, would be to introduce a badge of vassalage inconsistent with our free institu-
tions. If these families may buy of Snyder, then he may deliver his wares to them, and
use for the purpose the appropriate thoroughfares. The assault was therefore not
justifiable." People v. Moore, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 16s.
"' Derrington v. Plummer, 2o F.2d 922 (sth Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.924 (1957).
2109 U.S. 3 (1883).
242 io9 U.S. at i7. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases dealt with a statute enacted
pursuant to the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. It reserved for future litigation
the question of whether Congress could prohibit racial discrimination by private indi-
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It follows that a private store owner acting alone can discriminate against
Negro customers without violating the fourteenth amendment. A prob-
lem arises only when the store owner calls a policeman or otherwise
invokes the aid of the state judicial process in enforcing his privately-
originated discriminatory schemes.
The actions of the police 43 and of licensed private detectives244 are
the actions of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, even
when the police act contrary to the state law. 245  A United States Court
of Appeals held that a policeman acts under "color of law" when he
ejects a Negro from a privately-owned amusement park swimming pool
at the request of the proprietor and thereby subjects himself to suit for
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for denying the Negro
ticket-holder the right to make and enforce contracts. Moreover, the
proprietor who called the policeman is also subject to suit for his partici-
pation in the denial of constitutional rights.2 46  Another federal court
enjoined motion picture theater owners and two local police officials
from enforcing racially-segregated seating in the theater. The court
ruled that the practice instituted by the owners and aided by the police
violated the Federal Civil Rights Act in that all defendants deprived
Negro patrons of fundamental liberties under "color of law. ' '247
The actions of a judge, like the actions of a policeman, are the actions
of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. This was first
viduals under some constitutional power other than these amendments. The authority
of Congress under the power granted it by the interstate commerce clause to prohibit
discrimination by private owners of transport facilities is now established (see, e.g.,
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 8x6 (950)), as is the authority of Congress
under the power granted it to regulate the District of Columbia to prohibit discrimina-
tion by private owners of eating establishments (see, e.g., John R. Thompson Co. v.
District of Columbia, 346 U.S. oo (1953)).
2. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (x94-5).
2" Williams v. United States, 34-1 U.S. 97 (.951).
2
" When a policeman fails to act in a situation requiring action, his failure to per-
form his duty is illegal "state" action that gives the federal courts jurisdiction over a
suit against him. Catlette v. United States, 13z F.2d 9o2 (4 th Cir. 1943). In this
case, a deputy sheriff was indicted for "willfully" subjecting a person to the deprivation
of rights secured or protected by the Constitution. Catlette had stood by while a group
of American Legionnaires forced Jehovah's Witnesses to consume large quantities of
castor oil. The court said: "Since the failure of Catlette to protect the victims from
group violence or to arrest the members of the mob who assaulted the victims consti-
tuted a violation of his common law duty, his dereliction in this respect comes squarely
within the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 52 [the Civil Rights Act]." 13z F.2d at 907.
"'
6Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 ( 3 d Cir. 1949). See Note, Freedom To Contract,
A New Civil Right, 59 YALE L.J. 1167 (950).
""Manning v. Crowl (E.D. Pa., No. 10946, 1953), discussed in EMERSON &
HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1415 (2d ed. 1958).
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decided in 1879 when the Supreme Court held that a state judge who
denied Negroes the right to serve as jurors unconstitutionally violated
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court said
this :248
A state acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It
can act in no other way .... Whoever, by virtue of public position under a
state government denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, vio-
lates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of and for the
state, and is clothed with the state's power, his act is that of the state. This
must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the state
has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it.
Since that time, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state unconsti-
tutionally infringes upon liberties of speech and religion when a state
judge convicts a Jehovah's Witness for inciting breach of the peace by
playing an anti-Catholic phonograph record on the streets of a Catholic
neighborhood; 24 that a state unconstitutionally infringes rights of free
speech when a state judge convicts a leaflet distributor under the state
trespass law for remaining on privately-owned sidewalks when told by
the owner to leave;2 50 that a state unconstitutionally infringes on free-
dom of speech when a state judge enjoins "stranger picketing" under
a common-law policy banning all picketing unless done by the em-
ployer's own employees 251 that a state unduly infringes upon the right
of communication when a state judge jails a litigant for contempt of
court by publishing remarks hostile to the judge 252 and that state253 and
federal judges- 4 unconstitutionally interfere with the right of Negroes
to acquire property when they enforce the provisions of racial restrictive
covenants in real estate deeds. "That the action of state courts and
judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of
the state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a propo-
sition which has long been established by decisions of this court. 2 55
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that a state court cannot
award damages against a white vendor who violates the terms of a
restrictive covenant, because so doing would devitalize the constitutional
'"Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
240 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (-940).
2.. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o (1946).
2
"AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (94.).
"'Bridges v. California, 324 U.S. 252 (294.)..
23 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (2948).
2' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (i9o).
2
" Id. at 14.
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right of a Negro purchaser,250 and has questioned but not passed upon
the right of a state court to hear a defense involving private racial dis-
crimination.25 7  Similarly, the Court has questioned but not decided the
issue of whether judicial recognition and enforcement of a collective-
bargaining contract, under which an employee was discharged for al-
leged Communist activities, was state action in the sense that fourteenth
amendment restraints come into play.25 8 But whatever the outer reaches
of the doctrine may be, it is dear that judicial enforcement of the state
trespass laws is state action within the scope and meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. This, however, merely leads to the problem, for
it is not all "state action" that is unconstitutional. Is this particular state
action-4.e., judicial enforcement of state trespass laws at request of
dime store operators-unconstitutional?
It is no answer to say that dime stores are privately owned and
operated and, therefore, the proprietors have a right to do as they please
with their own businesses. The state has an obvious interest in every
business serving the public, and under certain conditions, it can, if it
wishes, enact statutes that regulate a host of items, including the wages
paid employees,' 9 the health and sanitary conditions,20 the prices
charged the customers,2 61 the items which can or cannot be sold,2 2 and
even the right of the proprietor to refuse service to a given class of
would-be customers. 2 3  "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute
in their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood
of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particu-
" Barrow v. Jackson, 346 U.S. z49 (x953).
2"Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.s. 70 (95s). Mrs. Rice,
a Caucasian, purchased a burial lot when her Indian husband was killed fighting in
Korea. Services were conducted at the grave site, but after the burial party had dis-
banded, the cemetery refused to bury the husband. The wife sued for damages, and
the cemetery defended on a clause in the burial lot contract of sale reciting that "burial
privileges accrue only to members of the Caucasian race." The wife moved to strike
this defense, contending that judicial recognition of such a clause was unconstitutional
state action. The trial court recognized the defense, and this was affirmed by the Iowa
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court heard the case and affirmed by evenly
divided vote. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case again, but after argu-
ment disco'vered that the Iowa legislature had outlawed such clauses after this incident,
and therefore dismissed the case as no longer raising "special and important?' questions.
2. Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
259 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2 0 Adams v. Milwaukee, z28 U.S. 57z 093).
2
. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
..2 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
2" California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. xo5 (.95.)
(poor insurance risks) Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. z8 (1948)
(Negroes).
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lar right is founded and which become strong enough to hold their own
when a certain point is reached. '2 64 A few analogies make this dear.
Private employers, as a general proposition, have freedom to hire
and fire whom they will. But when the congressionally granted right
of employees to engage in free self-organization comes into play, it
becomes an enjoinable offense for an employer to fire a worker because
of his prounion activities. 265 In like vein, the owners of private busi-
nesses, again as a general proposition, can bar trespassers from entering
their premises. But when the right of self-organization comes into
play, it sometimes becomes an enjoinable offence for employers to pro-
hibit the entrance of union organizers to distribute union handbills on
company-owned parking lots, on the company-owned sidewalks leading
to the street, or in the company-owned restaurants.266 In one unusual
situation, the owner of a retail store was ordered to make his business
premises available for a union mass meeting during working hours and
on paid-time.2 67  It is all a question of balancing conflicting societal in-
terests in the light of the facts of the given situation. As stated by the
Supreme Court :268
Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the
National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodations be-
tween the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is con-
sistent with the maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirma-
tively interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the
employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility of employees makes
ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with
them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has
been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of in-
formation on the right to organize.
In applying this "+ease of communication" test, companies whose em-
ployees come from many directions and far quarters are required to
open their premises to union organizers, whereas companies whose em-
ployees are centrally-located in a nearby community can enforce "no-
solicitation" and "no-trespass" rules.2 69
... The words are those of Mr. Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (19o8).
265 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i 0937).
266 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 0945).
2"?Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 905 (-953).
'
68 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
Compare Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (i945), with NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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just as the rights of private proprietorship to exclude undesirables
must sometimes yield to the right of employees to form unions of their
own choosing, so also the rights of private proprietorship to exclude
undesirables from their property must sometimes yield to the interest
of free speech and religion. Marsh v. Alabama 70 concerned a Jehovah's
witness who was arrested under the Alabama trespass law when she
refused the order of the town manager to cease distribution of religious
literature on the privately-owned sidewalks of the business district of
the company-owned town of Chickasaw. The Supreme Court held that
the arrest unconstitutionally infringed on rights of free speech and re-
ligion and said this :271
We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the ques-
tion. The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the
inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to
regulate the conduct of his guests. We cannot accept that contention.
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it.
This "open up his property for use by the public in general" test
has been applied subsequently in several contexts. The Virginia courts
have sustained the constitutionality of trespass laws as applied to Je-
hovah's Witnesses who distributed leaflets in the upper corridors of an
exclusive apartment house over the protest of the lobby attendant and
the apartment managerY.27  The New York courts have sustained the
right of one who owns 171 adjoining and interrelated apartment houses
to forbid Jehovah's Witnesses access to the inner hallways, but not the
private streets, lanes, and parks within the housing development.27 3
The Texas courts issued an injunction against Jehovah's Witnesses'
use of a park owned by a company as the undisputed state of the record
showed that the company intended to "maintain these premises for the
social and recreational use only of itself, its departments, and em-
ployees.2 4  The Massachusetts courts have held that the state trespass
270 326 U.S. 5o (1946).
271 Id. at 505-06.
272 Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369, appeal dismissed for lack of
substance in question presented, 335 U.S. 875 (-948).
27" Watchtower Bible & Tract Soe'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339,
79 N.E.zd 433 (948).
.. Good v. Dow Chemical Co., 247 S.W.zd 6o8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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law cannot lawfully be applied to a Jehovah's Witness who rings the
bells in the vestibule of an apartment house against the orders of the
owner as "an implied license was granted to the defendants and all
others engaged in lawful pursuits to make use of them for the purpose
of seeking an interview with the tenants. 12 75  These cases demonstrate
that the owner of property may invoke the state trespass laws to eject
undesirables if the property is truly "private" but, contrariwise, that the
owner of property nominally "private" but in actuality open to the pub-
lic has no such right.
Another series of cases, analogous to the problem here, holds that
the homeowner acting individually can reject unwelcome guests at his
doorstep; but that a city acting on behalf of its citizens can make blanket
rejections if, and only if, the unwelcome guest contributes nothing of
value to himself, the homeowner, or society. Many cities have sought
to protect their citizen home-owners from unwelcome door-to-door sales-
men by making it illegal for solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, and the like
to go upon private residences without prior invitation of the house-
holder. When the city of Struthers sought to apply this type of ordi-
nance to a Jehovah's Witness distributing hand bills advertising a re-
ligious meeting, the Supreme Court held the city action unconstitu-
tional :176
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that ... it must
be fully preserved. The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by
traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide
whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can
serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction
of the dissemination of ideas.
When the city of Alexandria sought to apply this type of ordinance
to a magazine salesman, the Supreme Court sustained the constitution-
ality of the city's action. Pointing out that the prior Struthers case
involved "the free distribution of an invitation to religious services,"
whereas here was involved the commercial solicitation of mass magazine
subscriptions, the Court said: "It would be, it seems to us, a misuse of
the great guarantees of free speech and free press to use those guaran-
tees to force a community to admit the solicitors of publications to the
home premises of its residents." 77  Justices Black and Douglas dis-
'7 Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 ('943).
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.s. 141, 146-147 (943).
77Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 6495(s95i).
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sented from this holding with the statement that "The constitutional
sanctuary for the press must necessarily include liberty to publish and
circulate." They too, however, would draw the line permitting city
punishment for home trespass according to the societal value of the
intrusion. Justice Black said: "Of course I believe that the present
ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a merchant who goes
from door to door selling pots. 27 8
There is yet another area of conduct where society sometimes pro-
hibits individuals from precluding unwelcome guests: the area of private
associations. As a general proposition, dubs, societies, and organizations
can admit to membership or reject from membership whomever they
please for whatever reasons they please. This unlimited power to ex-
clude from membership is premised on the supposed personal nature of
the relationship and the futility of attempting to force one man's com-
panionship on another .1 9  But the seriousness of the consequences of an
exclusion or expulsion varies greatly in different kinds of associations :2 0
Expulsion from a secret society, or the refusal of the grand lodge to give its
password to the delegate of a subordinate lodge, or the revocation of the
charter of a college sorority, leave no permanent wounds .... But the skilled
workman who is thrown out of his trade union, the physician expelled from
the medical association, or the broker expelled by the stock exchange, will
often find is very hard to earn a livelihood.
The degree to which the "private society" performs a function or service
vital to the excluded individual determines the line drawn by the courts
when asked to grant relief to a person excluded from societal member-
ship. This is demonstrated in a series of cases involving labor unions,
long considered as being no different from any other fraternal organiza-
tions and therefore governed by the same set of legal rules.28 1 A union
of bricklayers, for example, is free to exclude Negro bricklayers from
membership on the theory that the union represents and bargains only
for its members and because there is nothing to prevent Negro brick-
layers from organizing a union of their oWn. 2 82  However, when the
nature of the industry is such that two or more unions cannot exist side
2 8Id. at 650.
.-
9Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 37 (9€47).
280 Chafee, The Internal 4ffairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv.
993, 1021 (1930).
281 "The legal status of unions is practically identical with that of fraternal organiza-
tions." WITTE, GOVERNMENT IN LAnOR DISPUTES 13-14
. 
(1932).
2S2Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 8z N.W.2d 315 (1957).
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by side, and as a consequence, the union chosen by a majority of the
employees speaks and acts on behalf of all employees, the union is then
required to represent all on an equal basis-white member and Negro
nonmember alike.2 3 And when membership in a union becomes a con-
dition of employment, the union that functions under state protection
and holds itself out to represent the needs of employees loses its status
as a private organization and is obligated to accept all qualified appli-
cants for membership.284
A final analogy to the situation at hand is found in the racial re-
strictive covenant cases. A racial restrictive covenant is an agreement
entered into by fellow property owners whereby each agrees not to sell
to a member of a designated race. The cases arose when white property
owners sold to Negroes and neighboring white property owners asked
the courts to enforce the covenants by ejecting the Negro occupants.
The Supreme Court ruled that the requested judicial relief unconstitu-
tionally deprived Negroes of "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens.., to ... purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property. 28 5 The Court pointed out that "these are not cases,
as has been suggested, in which the states have merely abstained from
action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as
they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which States have made available
to such individuals the full coercive power of government .... ,21 6 The
Court concluded that "The Constitution confers upon no individual the
right to demand action by the state which results in the denial of equal
protection of the laws to other individuals."2 'T In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court relied upon Marsh v. Alabama,88 which prohibited
2. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 333 U.S. 192 (1944).
284 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.zd 329 (1945)5 Betts v.
Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.zd 831 (1946). The necessity that a Negro employee have
a voice and a vote in the union which represents his economic interest justifies a state
statute's prohibiting union discrimination. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 3z6 U.S. 88
(1945). There the Court said:
"Appellant [union] contends that [the law] . . . offends the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an interference with its right of selection to membership ....
A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would
be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to
prevent ... discrimination on the basis of race or color. We see no constitutional basis
for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis
of race, color or creed by an organization, functioning under the protection of the state,
which holds itself out to represent the general business needs of employees." Id. at 93-
94. 85 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 5 Hurd v. Hodge! 334 U.S. 24 (948).
28' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (-948).
2 87 1d. at 2Z. 288 326 U.S. 50 (1946).
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state judicial enforcement of trespass laws; upon Buchanan v. Warley,89
which invalidated a city statute prohibiting a white vendor from selling
to a would-be Negro purchaser; upon Richmond v. Deans,90 which
nullified a city ordinance prohibiting Negroes the right to seek out and
purchase homes in a "white" neighborhood; and upon Oyama v. Cali-
fornia,291 which declared unconstitutional a state law denying equal
enjoyment of property rights to Japanese. The intermingled reliance
on case authority involving state judicial and state legislative action
makes it dear that if a state cannot command discrimination by legis-
lative fiat, it cannot achieve the same result by judicial enforcement of
individual discriminatory practices.
The above analogies indicate that the dime-store owners cannot seek
judicial aid to remove undesired Negro patrons from their lunch coun-
ters.29 Today's restauranteur occupies a position analogous to that of
the innkeeper in Merrie England and to that of the modern American
trade union. He operates under state control and inspection, and per-
forms a service that is vital to the general public. "Eating out" is no
longer a social treat or family outing. Thousands of our citizens live
in rented rooms with no kitchen facilities, and additional millions work
in situations where they cannot go home for lunch. If these persons
cannot eat in restaurants, they are deprived of the necessities of life.
It smacks too much of Marie Antoinette to suggest that the combination
of grocery stores and city parks provides a suitable alternative to the
restaurant. The right of opportunity to eat at a restaurant is as basic
as the right of employees to free self-organization,293 as basic as the
right to union membership, 94 as basic as the right of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses to distribute religious handbills at the open front door of the
homeowner,29 s and fully as basic as the right to acquire suitable hous-
1S8 245 U.S. 6o (9-7). 2a0 2S U.S. 704 (.930).
1D9 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
292 Whether or not the storekeepers can hire a private detective to eject Negro cus-
tomers is a difficult and unresolved question. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club,
227 U.S. 633 (1913), holds that a patron ejected with no more force than necessary
from a race track has no cause of action in assault and battery. However, should an
ejected Negro patron sue a restaurant owner for assault and battery, and should the
restaurant owner defend on the theory that he does not serve Negroes, it is questionable
that the fourteenth amendment would permit the state courts to recognize such a defense.
See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955), discussed in note
257 supra.
2" See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (-945).
2 1 See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.zd 329 (1945).
... See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 4.t (I943).
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ing 96 All these mentioned rights have been held to be paramount to
the right of privacy, the right to enforce "no trespass" rules, and the
right of freedom of choice in association. Moreover, on the other side
of the coin, it should be noted that today's typical restaurant is no longer
a place where habitues gather at appointed tables with old cronies for a
glass of beer, a game of whist, and an opportunity to discuss events of
the day. Today's typical restaurants are, in the literal sense of the word,
"public houses." To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Ala-
bam,, 2 7 today's restauranteur, for his advantage, has opened his prop-
erty for use by the public in general, and his rights have become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of the public
in general. Ownership in these circumstances no longer means absolute
dominion.
There is, therefore, ample legal ground for holding that the appli-
cation of state trespass laws to the dime-store demonstrators wrongfully
deprives them of fundamental rights of citizenship protected by federal
statute and constitutional amendment. Whether or not the courts will
reach this result remains to be seen.298 In the meantime, it is well to
mark the words of Dr. Frank Graham on this problem:99
When human rights are conceived as trespassing on property rights it
should be recalled that property rights are securer and individual rights are
freer when human rights are fairer.
2"5 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i (1948).
.or 32 6 U.S. 5o, 505-06 (.946).
.. The sit-in demonstrators have been much condemned for adopting "illegal" tac-
tics. It is commented that the violation of trespass laws has set the Negro cause back
several years. It should be noted, however, that it was not until Negroes had "tres-
passed" into pullman cars, into railroad dining cars, into "white only" waiting rooms,
into the "white" sections of buses, that their right to nondiscriminatory service was
established in the courts. Indeed, "1trespass" is the only way to test the legality of
"white only" lunch counters. See, e.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. z02 (1958), where
the city of Memphis moved to dismiss a suit involving segregated bus service on the
ground that there was no "actual controversy" because the Negro litigant had ridden
the bus only once and thus had no standing to bring the suit. More important, perhaps,
is the fact that critics of the "trespass" technique overlook the failure of all but the
direct approach to achieve for the Negro his rightful place in a democratic society.
Constitutional amendments, congressional enactments, and Supreme Court decisions have
failed to achieve their desired purpose. It was inevitable, therefore, that a more direct
approach would be sought; fortunately it was a Christian nonviolent approach. "Many
Negroes recognize the necessity for creating discord to alter established community pat-
terns, but they strongly desire that controls be built in, so that neither they nor their
adversaries would find themselves engaged in mutual destruction." King, The Burning
Truth In The South, The Progressive, May 196o, p. 9.
2"9 Address, United Nations Model Assembly, Williamsburg, Va., March iii, i96o.
Carolina Times (Durham, N.C.) March i9, 196o, p. 2, col. 3.
